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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cognitive psychology has been centrally concerned with the nature of
human cognition and its ontogenetic development. It has largely treated
this process as the emergence of a universal cognitive structure from innate
sources. In this dissertation I try to give empirical access to these postulated
inherited sources and assess their pliability in the face of the process of cog-
nitive development and cross-cultural variation. The investigated cognitive
domain is spatial cognition, which has been extensively studied in adults,
infants and animals alike and therefore offers a solid platform for discussion.
So the two central questions guiding this thesis are:
1. Are there inherited defaults for spatial cognition in humans?
2. If so, are they affected by uniquely human capacities such as
language?
In chapter 2, using a basic spatial memory task, I first contrast the skills
of all the extant great apes1 including 1-year old human infants. Results
show that all non-human great apes and 1-year old human infants exhibit
a preference for place over feature strategies for spatial memory2. I will
argue that this suggests the common ancestor of all great apes had the same
preference. Further tests revealed the reverse preference in 3-year old human
children. Thus, the continuity between our species and the other great apes
is masked during early human ontogeny. Increasing language proficiency and
the accompanying rapid enculturation are discussed as possible explanations
for the change in strategy-preference.
Language and culture facilitate flexible adaptations to varying ecologies,
enabling humans to inhabit a vast repertoire of environments. So if language
and culture vary across humans, and if language and culture can restructure
our inherited predispositions in early development (chapter 2), mature cogni-
tion should also vary between cultural communities3. Chapter 3 addresses
1For more details on the tested non-human species, see Appendix 6.2.1
2For more details on the the terms and definitions of this thesis, see Appendix 6.1
3For more details on the the different tested cultural communities, see Appendix 6.2.2
3the question if variability across languages might result in cognitive variab-
ility across their speakers. Dutch and Namibian elementary school children
were compared using a spatial reconstruction task. The two cultures differ
in the way they predominantly express spatial relations in language. Three
experiments investigated cognitive strategy preferences across different levels
of task-complexity and instruction. Data show a correlation between dom-
inant linguistic spatial frames of reference and performance patterns in a
non-linguistic spatial memory task. When instructed to use their respective
non-habitual cognitive strategy, participants were not easily able to switch
between strategies and their attempts to do so decreased their performance
levels. The possibility that language might play a role in inducing stable
preferences in cognitive strategy is discussed.
On the one hand, all humans inherit cognitive predispositions from an
evolutionary ancestor (chapter 2). On the other hand, human cognition is
variably adaptable to cultural circumstance (chapter 3). Although these two
statements could be seen to contradict each other, I argue in chapter 4 that
they need not be. First, the same two cultural groups as in chapter 3 are
compared on their cognition for spatial relations. As before the two cultural
groups diverge, parallel to linguistic coding strategies. Furthermore, mature
non-human great apes were tested with the very same spatial task to estab-
lish the inherited primate baseline. Results show that human culture can
override even the basic cognitive preferences we inherited from our common
ancestor with the other great apes. In conclusion I propose a model for hu-
man cognition that has a rich, inherited primate basis, which may be masked
by language and culture, predicting differential human performance in the
conditions where culture overrides an inherited default strategy.
We will only be in a position to appreciate the distinctive hallmarks of
human cognition when we understand both the continuities and discon-
tinuities within Homo sapiens and across all the extant members of our
immediate phylogenetic family, the Hominidae.
4 Introduction
1.1 Continuities
“Curiously enough, the only thing that went through the mind of the bowl of petunias as
it fell was ‘Oh no, not again’. Many people have speculated that if we knew exactly why
the bowl of petunias had thought that, we would know a lot more about the nature of the
universe than we do now.”
(Douglas Adams, A hitchhikers guide to the galaxy)
Are there inherited cognitive defaults for spatial cognition in humans? How
would we know? Different approaches have been taken to unearth inherited
structures of human cognitive architecture. Here I will give abridged accounts
of the two most prominent research strategies, mention some of their pitfalls
and finally describe the methodology of this thesis.
1.1.1 The developmental approach:
How low can you go?
The developmental approach to the quest for the inherited mental defaults is
in essence to test cognitive abilities early in infancy, before children have had
a feasible chance to acquire them other than by genetic endowment. The
study of human cognitive development has made immense methodological
advances especially in the last 20 years. For example recent habituation
paradigms allow testing below the threshold of early developmental studies
based on object choice or qualitative observation. In these studies children
are presented with a long series of stimuli, which share a particular dimension
until the infant is ‘bored’. Then a new stimulus is presented which breaks the
established dimensional match. Different measures such as gazing behaviour,
sucking rate or brain potentials can be used to tests the infants surprise,
indicating they are sensitive to the tested dimension. As a result of this
and other methodological advances, younger and younger infants have been
attributed with more and more complex cognitive skills (Carey, 1985; Keil,
1989). Already right after birth infants recognize abstract drawings of human
faces among other stimuli (M. Johnson & Morton, 1991), at 5 months they
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understand simple addition and subtraction of hidden objects (Wynn, 1992)
and by 6 months infants display a rudimentary sense of number (Xu & Spelke,
2000). These and many more similar findings fuelled the general suspicion in
mainstream cognitive psychology that at least some basic cognitive functions
are hardwired in humans from birth. The existence and nature of the innate
endowment is still a major topic in the field (Carey & Spelke, 1996; Carey,
2004; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Elman et al., 1996;
Fodor, 1983; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Spelke & Newport, 1998; Tomasello,
2003).
The developmental approach in my view suffers at least two limitations:
(1) Higher cognitive components develop in parallel with more fundamental
functions such as sensory- and motor-abilities. And those in turn put re-
straints on psychological methodology. Preferential looking paradigms are
of no use, if the infant has not mastered control of gazing behaviour. Every
method will have its lower age-boundary, imposed by one or the other devel-
opmental constraint, which may be unrelated to the cognitive ability under
investigation. What do we conclude about the time before we gained ac-
cess to an infants mind? We simply cannot know if an infant did have a
sense of number before 6 months of age until we test a 5 month old. This
criticism is obvious and many researchers demonstrate awareness of the lim-
itations it poses on their conclusions (Hood, Carey, & Prasada, 2000; S. P.
Johnson, 2003). But there is a further constraint of the developmental ap-
proach which is slightly less obvious. (2) Many cognitive abilities develop
relatively late. For example relational thought, including the ability to un-
derstand from a set of trials that defining object properties might not lie in
the object itself, but in its relations to other objects. A simple relational
rule might be that the correct choice is the object with the same size re-
lationship to the other objects in a set as a previously observed choice (If
I pick the largest, you should pick the largest). Children successfully infer
such a rule from feedback and apply it successfully from roughly 4 years of
age onwards (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998). At 4 years infants also walk,
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talk and go to school (at least in some countries). They have had plenty
of time to acquire relational thought by other means than inheritance. So
for example, in chapter 4, where relational spatial concepts are at stake, it
makes no sense to look at human infants. But do we have to conclude that
there are no inherited preconditions for relational thought? Spatial relations
between objects provide basic framing structures for the encoding of events
(Burgess, 2002) and relational thought in general forms the basis for proposi-
tional structure, predication, understanding analogy and metaphor (Gentner,
2003; Tomasello, 2003). Relational learning is central to human cognition, so
there is reason to suspect an inherited substrate. I want to argue that there
is no a priory reason to exclude the possibility of inherited preconditions in
late-blooming cognitive domains. But since they develop later in life, there is
no infant data available to shed light on such inherited predispositions. The
developmental approach is insufficient. Several researchers, some already in
the early days of Psychology (Ko¨hler, 1921), have come to the same con-
clusion and turned to a different source of information to complement the
developmental approach: Non-human animals (Call, 2003; Hauser & Spelke,
2004; Langer, 2001; Tomasello, 2000).
1.1.2 The comparative approach:
Reconstructing evolutionary history
For current purposes, inherited traits should be seen as part of the evolution-
ary endowment of the species. That endowment is either a unique adaptation
which has occurred in human prehistory or it was passed on to us by an evol-
utionary ancestor. How far back in evolutionary time this endowment can
be traced depends of course on the trait. The argument here concerns those
cognitive traits which are not uniquely human, which comprise the major-
ity of human basic cognitive abilities. So in this sense, inherited cognitive
preconditions are passed on to us by an evolutionary ancestor. The prob-
lem with evolutionary ancestors as a source of information is that they are
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all dead. To avoid this problem, psychologists have turned to the next best
alternative: Extant phylogenetic relatives.
The comparative approach to the quest for the inherited human mental
defaults is in essence to infer cognitive abilities in an evolutionary ancestor
to Homo sapiens. Any cognitive ability, which is part of a shared repertoire
between two related species, might be part of the evolutionary inheritance
ever since their last common ancestor. This argument was accessibly out-
lined by Richard Byrne (1995). In his formulation he made clear the limits
and restrictions to this approach, part of which I will build on in further
arguments below. Following the comparative approach, humans have been
compared to capuchin monkeys (Brosnan & Waal, 2003), tamarins (Miller,
Dibble, & Hauser, 2001), and chimpanzees (Povinelli, Boysen, & Nelson,
1990; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) to name but a few. And indeed continu-
ities between humans and our phylogenetic cousins are striking. Not only
do other primates display understanding of faces (Tomonaga et al., 2004),
distinctiveness of hidden objects (Hauser, MacNeilage, & Ware, 1996) and
number (Hauser & Carey, 2003), they also display ‘human-like’ abilities in
more complex cognitive tasks such as perspective taking (Hare, Call, & To-
masello, 2001; Liebal, Pika, Call, & Tomasello, 2004) and cooperation (Melis,
Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). Without questioning the great progress the inclu-
sion of primate data has brought towards the quest for the inherited defaults
of human cognition, I would like to raise some concerns which lead me to the
more systematic approach adapted in this thesis. I will argue that compar-
ing new world monkeys to humans provides little evidence about the mental
properties of their common ancestor. I will also argue that comparing chim-
panzees to humans is generally more dependable when making a statement
about human ancestors, but that other, ideally larger combinations of species
might be even more powerful. To make the argument accessible we have to
take a short detour into the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens and our
taxonomic relationships to other primates.
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1.1.3 Cognitive cladistics:
Reading the mind of the common ancestor
Taxonomy is a nested classification of groups or ‘taxa’ (Greek, singular:
taxon) based on some form of similarity. The only way in which an an-
imal could be a member of two groups is if one included the other. For
example, humans are primates and primates are animals. So it would be cor-
rect to say humans are primates and animals. The smallest taxon is usually
the species (a group of potentially interbreeding individuals). Species are
grouped into genera (Greek, singular: genus). Genera are then grouped into
families, families into orders, orders into classes, classes into phyla (Greek,
singular: Phylum) and finally phyla into kingdoms. Evolutionary taxonomy,
or cladistics, is the classification of species in such a way that it correctly
reflects evolutionary history. A valid grouping or ‘clade’ within evolutionary
taxonomy is a group of species with a common ancestor that is not ancestral
to any other species (monophyletic group). The currently most common, but
by far not the only measure of similarity in cladistics is molecular structure
and function (Enard & Pa¨a¨bo, 2004). Figure 1.1 presents a tentative evolu-
tionary taxonomy of our own order: The primates. While classic cladistics
usually analyzes similarity of traits across species to infer their relationship-
status, one can also invert the argument. Based on any reliable set of taxo-
nomic relations of living species we can reconstruct states of the common
ancestor. The argument goes as follows: If a certain trait exists in all taxa
of a clade, the trait must have been present in their common ancestor. This
logic would only fail us if the same trait had evolved independently several
times within the same clade. This phenomenon is called convergent evolution
or homoplasy. The chance that homoplasy accounts for a shared trait within
a clade can be decreased following a simple rule: Compare as many species
with common inheritance as possible. Every added related species display-
ing the same trait decreases the likelihood of an independent evolution of the
same trait in all of them. So in essence we can follow two maxims: Com-
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Figure 1.1: Taxonomic tree of the order primates (based on the ‘Tree of Life’
project: http://tolweb.org/tree)
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pleteness and extensiveness. Ideally one would compare all extant species
(completeness) of a maximally large taxonomic group (extensiveness) with
a single common ancestor. From this general rule we can create a scale on
which we can compare studies on the power with which they allow inferences
concerning the common ancestor of the tested species based on the taxo-
nomic relationships of those species. The division of animals into species is
constantly debated and always changing. Therefore I will use genera instead
of species for this scale, as they are less controversial (Figure 1.1). So let n
be the number of tested genera and N be the total number of extant genera
sharing the same common ancestor as all members of n. If we now put them
in a very simple relationship and give it a name (inferential power index =
IPI ) it might help us to design a maximally powerful study for our purposes.
IPI =
n
2
N
(1.1)
IPI varies from 0 to n, where increasing numbers would indicate a higher
inferential power. This measure can be nothing but a rule of thumb to
support the argument on which I rest this thesis. If it was to serve a more
general purpose it should also include the average number of individuals
tested for each genus and a measure for the variability of the tested trait
within the genera.4 However, for now it will suffice.
Let us turn back to the comparative approach and make clear the unsys-
tematic way in which it is practiced for the purposes of cognitive psychology.
Table 1.1 lists some recent studies making inferences about the common
ancestor of different samples of primate species. I argued before that by
comparing humans to for example tamarins, little to no knowledge can be
gained about the last common ancestor of the two. Thirty-four other genera
share the same common ancestor as humans and tamarins (see Figure 1.1).
According to the two maxims above, Miller et al. (2001) (see Table 1.1) can
4These kinds of measures exist (Ronquist, 2004), but are too complex and detailed for
the current purpose.
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Table 1.1: Prominent recent studies making inferences about the common
ancestor of different samples of primate species. The IPI (inferential power
index) represents the relative power of the inference.
Reference Tested genera Conclusion IPI
Brosnan et al. (2003)
Nature
Cebus (capuchin) “Monkeys refused to participate if
they witnessed a conspecific ob-
tain a more attractive reward for
equal effort. . . These reactions sup-
port an early evolutionary origin of
inequity aversion.” (p. 297)
0.03
Miller et al. (2001)
Nature Neuroscience
Saguinus (tamarin)
Homo (human)
“Given the phylogenetic related-
ness of humans and cotton-top
tamarins, these results suggest
that the neural mechanisms medi-
ating auditory continuity may have
evolved in a common ancestor at
least 40 million years ago. . . and
possibly earlier.” (p.784)
0.11
Whiten et al. (2005)
Nature
Pan (chimpanzee) “Our data. . . demonstrate a clear
capacity for the cultural trans-
mission of alternative technologies
among apes. These results suggest
an ancient origin for the conform-
ist cultural propensities so evident
in humans.” (p. 739)
0.5
Warneken et al. (2006)
Science
Pan (chimpanzee)
Homo (human)
“However, our nearest primate rel-
atives show some skills and motiv-
ations in this direction as well, and
this suggests that the common an-
cestor to chimpanzees and humans
already possessed some tendency
to help. . . .” (p.1301)
2.0
Bra¨uer et al. (2005)
Journal of Comparat-
ive Psychology
Pongo (orangutan)
Gorilla (gorilla)
Pan (chimpanzee)
“These results. . . suggest that apes
have an appreciation of what oth-
ers can and cannot see. Since all
great apes display those skills it
is conceivable that they were also
present in their common ancestor.”
(p.153)
2.25
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claim neither completeness, nor extensiveness. To make a believable argu-
ment about the existence of a trait in the common ancestor between humans
and tamarins, we would need to consider at least 10 (IPI = 2.9) other genera
with the same ancestor. I also argued before that comparing chimpanzees
and humans (e.g., Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) is a more informative ap-
proach, but can still be improved. This approach is more informative because
Homo (represented by humans) and Pan (represented by chimpanzees) are
the only two extant genera descending from a single common ancestor who
lived roughly 5-6 million years ago. Therefore these studies can claim com-
pleteness but nevertheless only present a small sample-size of tested genera.
The likelihood that the trait in question independently evolved since the last
common ancestor in just two species is obviously higher than the same trait
coinciding in let’s say a complete clade including ten genera.
There is one final concern I would like to raise considering the standard
comparative approach. All of the studies mentioned above, and to my know-
ledge all comparative studies on evolution of the human mind have compared
abilities across species. These results are always subject to a trivial counter-
argument: All tests are devised by humans. For that simple reason, tasks
are most likely posed in ways that are intuitive to humans but not necessar-
ily to other species. Even if we managed to create a test, which is intuitive
to chimpanzees, it might for the same reason not be intuitive to gorillas or
tamarins. Therefore all differences in ability can be dismissed by claiming
that experiments are just not well enough adapted to suit all tested species.
Of course this problem increases with the number of tested species (n).
Instead of attempting to solve the problem as others have (Povinelli,
Bering, & Giambrone, 2000; Hare & Tomasello, 2004), it can be circumvented
by testing preferences instead of abilities. The tasks presented in chapters 2
and 4 of this thesis can easily be solved by all tested genera, but allow for
different alternative interpretations and therefore different strategies that can
be adopted to solve them. If the tested genera now differ in their preferred
choice of strategy, differences cannot be due to lack of ability. If the genera
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share a preference for one particular strategy over another (hence are quicker
to learn it and/or better at applying it in comparison to another), we are
able to make a very strong argument for the existence of that preference in
the shared common ancestor, avoiding discussion about fair tests of ability.
In summary, any study comparing cognitive preferences between all ex-
tant genera of great apes (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan and Homo) would score an
IPI of 4 and be a powerful approach to the quest for the inherited cognitive
defaults in humans. Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis will be based on this
combination of data.
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1.2 Discontinuities
“It is of course perfectly natural to assume that everyone else is having a far better time
than you. Human beings have a phrase ‘The other man’s grass is always greener’, which
describes this phenomenon. The Sheltenack race had a similar phrase, but since their
planet is somewhat eccentric botanically speaking, the best they could manage was ‘The
other Sheltenack’s jupleberry shrub is always a more mauvey shade of pinky russet’ and
so the expression soon fell into disuse ... and the Sheltenacks had little option but to
become terribly happy and contented with their lot - much to the surprise of everyone in
the galaxy, who had not realized that the best way not to be unhappy was not to have a
word for it.”
(Douglas Adams, A hitchhikers guide to the galaxy)
Do inherited cognitive defaults vary across ontogeny? Do they vary across
cultures? Some cognitive defaults are common amongst the great apes ever
since their last common ancestor. However, they might still be affected
by cognitive or other factors that are unique to the human species. For
example language has been argued to be a driving force of cognitive change
and cultural adaptation in humans (Dennet, 1991; Levinson, 2003a; Lucy,
1992; Vygotsky, 1962). The present thesis investigates the possibility that
even inherited cognitive predisposition might be affected by human language.
There is a long standing debate in the cognitive sciences wether lan-
guage can affect other cognitive functions. Put provocatively, the question is
whether language changes the way we think. The question is not if language
can transmit information, which in turn might change the way we think
about things. Language can inform or misinform, encourage or dishearten.
As Bloom and Keil put it: “This is what language is for.” (2001, p.354; em-
phasis original). The more interesting question is if language shapes thought
in any way other than by means of the information it conveys. Does the
structure of language - be it syntactic, morphological, semantic or otherwise
- influence the structure of other cognitive processes such as for example
representing, categorizing, remembering and reasoning (Bloom & Keil, 2001;
Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002)?
Many interesting commonsense questions arise from entertaining the idea
that language might shape thought: Imagine having been raised without a
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language, as a wild-child. Would your thoughts be very different from your
thoughts now? Do animals think in other ways than we do? Do speakers
of different languages think differently? There is a simple answer to these
questions, which represents the mainstream in most cognitive sciences: “In
our view the answer to these questions tends to be no.” (Papafragou et
al., 2002, p.54). “Does language have a dramatic influence on thought in
some other way than through communication? Probably not.” (Bloom &
Keil, 2001, p.364). One simply cannot say what one cannot already think.
Language codes pre-existing cognitive concepts and therefore cognition takes
the lead in human development (Langer, 2001; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005;
Fodor, 1985). Learning a first language then means to learn how to translate
the universal language of thought into a form that can be communicated to
others (Pinker, 1994; Fodor, 1975). Hence all humans think alike, irrespective
of the language they speak (Fodor, 1985; Papafragou et al., 2002). In short,
the widespread position in cognitive science is that (1) human conceptual
structure is relatively constant across cultures, (2) conceptual structure and
semantic structure are tightly coupled, and (3) therefore neither cognition nor
semantics vary substantially across humans. Following this line of reasoning,
inherited cognitive defaults could not be changed through language.
The alternative position, namely that language might impact other cog-
nitive functions, is held in different flavours and intensities. Some argue for
a general effect of language, which results in cognitive differences between
speakers of any language and other animals without a comparable semi-
otic system (Vygotsky, 1962; Carruthers, 2002; Deacon, 1997; Dennet, 1991;
Spelke, 2003). The second account argues for a specific effect of languages,
which results in cognitive differences between speakers of different languages
(Whorf, 1956; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Gentner, 2003; Levinson, 2003a;
Lucy, 1992).
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1.2.1 General effects of language
“Perhaps the kind of mind you get when you add language to it is so different from the
kind of mind you can have without language that calling them both minds is a mistake.”
(Dennet, 1996, p.17)
The world presents itself quite differently to various species by virtue of their
varying sensory capacities including neural functions for organizing, storing
and manipulating incoming information. The question here is if, in similar
ways, the availability and use of language might fundamentally alter the vis-
ion humans hold of their world relative to other species. The acquisition of
language is one of the major events in early human development. Coeval with
different levels of language mastery are substantial changes in other cognitive
domains. The tightly interweaved developmental trajectory of linguistic con-
cepts and non-linguistic cognitive abilities has led many researchers to believe
the two to be correlated and most likely even causally related. However there
is a sharp divide amongst scientists as to which of the two human capacities,
language or cognition, might take the lead. Early on, Vygotsky, Bruner and
others argued that language allows for the translation of experience into a
more symbolic form, enabling cognitive processing of remotely or arbitrarily
related experiences even in their complete absence (Bruner, 1964; Vygotsky,
1962), creating intellectual possibilities that are orders of magnitude beyond
any non-symbolic cognitive system. They showed for example that symbolic
and relational rules are more easily learned by children with internalized
speech than by younger children without internal language (Bruner, 1964)
or non-human primates (Kendler & Kendler, 1962). Versions of this original
view are still held in the current literature, although in different varieties:
Some believe that language is an integral part of concept formation (Gent-
ner, 2003; Xu, 2002) and that this formation happens stepwise as specific
linguistic concepts aid acquisition of their cognitive counterparts at different
points during child development. For example, language facilitates object in-
dividuation through naming already at around 1 year of age (Xu, 2002; Xu,
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Cote, & Baker, 2005), while some parts of relational language are only pro-
ficiently used and aid relational thought around 4 years of age (Rattermann
& Gentner, 1998; Gentner, 2003; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005). Others
believe that cognitive concepts are innately pre-defined in children, but that
the combinatorial structure of natural language allows for new combinations
between these pre-existing concepts (Spelke, 2003; Carruthers, 2002). This
combination of existing sources of information gives access to new sets of
information beyond the abilities of non-linguistic animals. The resulting
functional architecture, emerging under the impact of natural language, is
more than the sum of its parts.
So if cognition is dramatically restructured after the first year of life, be it
through concept formation or conceptual recombination, what happens to the
inherited cognitive defaults we might identify using the cognitive cladistics
approach? Are these phylogenetic endowments essential to our species and
therefore rigid and conservative? Or alternatively, are even these inherited
cognitive structures subject to uniquely human processes in ontogeny? This
question is approached experimentally in chapter 2 by testing all extant non-
human great ape species and human infants before (1-year old) and after
(3-years old) this proposed major period of cognitive change.
1.2.2 Specific effects of languages
”The thing is: I hate relativism. I hate relativism more than I hate anything else, except-
ing, maybe, fibreglass powerboats. ”
(Fodor, 1985, p.5, emphasis original)
At this point it is important to consider that language in fact varies. Syn-
tax as well as semantics differ greatly between human communities. Spoken
languages may have anywhere between 11 and 141 distinct phonemes (Mad-
dieson, 1984). Languages may or may not use constituent structure to encode
grammatical relations (Austin & Bresnan, 1996; Levinson, 1987), so they
might or might not have syntactic constraints on word order. Languages may
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or may not make use of basic word class distinctions, such as adjective or
adverb. Some languages express aspect, some don’t; some have seven tenses,
others have none; some force marking of honorability for each noun-phrase,
some do not and so on and so forth (Levinson, 2003a). But languages don’t
only vary in their syntactic structure. They also have been documented to
vary in basic semantic domains such as colour (Brown & Lenneberg, 1954),
landscape (Burenhult, in preparation), the body (Majid, Enfield, & Staden,
2006), motion (Talmy, 1975) and space (Levinson & Wilkins, 2006). The
combination of these facts with a (post-)Vygotskian approach leads to the
following consideration: If language-structure impacts cognition during hu-
man development and if additionally language-structure varies across cultural
communities, mature cognition should also vary between cultures. The pro-
posal that variability across languages might result in cognitive variability
across their speakers was most prominently articulated by Whorf (1956) and
is therefore often referred to as the ‘Whorf-’ or ‘Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis’.
The central argument starts with the fact that each language has only a
finite number of devices at its disposal to refer to an infinite variety of exper-
ience. Thus, languages, for the purpose of speech, somehow need to condense
and chunk experience by classifying things as ‘the same’ which are in many
ways quite different. These classifications are not arbitrary, but are based
on meaningful criteria, which might in turn vary across languages. Any lan-
guage then provides its speakers with ready-made structures of experience,
which serve as grooves to guide thought (Lucy & Wertsch, 1987). Given
the cross-linguistic variations in conceptual domains mentioned above, the
system of categories each language provides is not a common, universally
shared system, but one peculiar to the individual language. In short, Whorf
(1956) argued that (1) languages vary in their semantic partitioning of ex-
perience, (2) linguistic categories are used as guides for habitual thought,
and (3) therefore speakers of different languages will categorize their world
differently. Attempting to interpret experience, speakers will intuitively use
the categories provided by their language, without usually being aware of it.
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This does not mean that language categories, in Whorf’s view, blind speak-
ers to an obvious reality, but that they suggest associations, which might not
necessarily be entailed by objective experience.
In the last few years, linguistic relativity has had something of a renais-
sance (Bowerman & Levinson, 2001; Hunt & Agnoli, 1991; Gumperz & Levin-
son, 1996; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). To date, cross-cultural effects
that can be predicted by language differences have been found for example in
the cognitive processing of colour (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000), num-
ber (Gordon, 2004; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004), time (Boroditsky,
2001) and space (Levinson & Brown, 1994; Mishra & Dasen, 2005; Neumann
& Widlok, 1996; Pederson et al., 1998; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998). However,
none of these claims are uncontroversial and opposition is broad and out-
spoken (Fodor, 1985; Bloom & Keil, 2001; Li & Gleitman, 2002; Gleitman
& Papafragou, 2005). The Whorfian hypothesis is still perceived by many as
a nuisance, relentlessly entertained by stubborn rebels for a hopeless cause
(Fodor, 1985).
There might be several reasons for the strong reluctance shown towards
linguistic relativity within cognitive psychology. Firstly, linguistic relativ-
ity is often falsely equated with ‘linguistic determinism’, which states that
some languages absolutely close off their speakers from parts of perceptual
experience. These claims did not stand up to experimental investigation
(Heider, 1972), resulting in extreme scepticism about the possibility of any
influence of language on thought (Clark & Clark, 1977; Devitt & Sterelny,
1987; Pinker, 1994), and still serve as a straw-man for opponents of milder
forms of linguistic relativity (Li, Abarbanell, & Papafragou, 2005). Secondly,
some argue that linguistic relativity opens the door to ethnical relativism and
racist arguments. Finally, cognitive psychologists might fear that accepting
linguistic relativity will effectively undermine their scientific conduct. In the
field of cognitive psychology, it is standard procedure to recruit students from
psychology undergraduate classes and, based on their performance, make in-
ferences about the human mind, relying on the assumption that people are
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people (Gergen, 1973; Sears, 1986; Medin & Atran, 2004; Norenzayan &
Heine, 2005). The idea that speakers of different languages might vary in
their proficiency to discriminate green and blue, 7 and 8, or right and left
puts strains on the generalizability of experimental results using very restric-
ted populations.
The currently most successful research strategy used to test the linguistic
relativity is a hybrid of linguistic typology and cognitive psychology. First,
different languages are compared on their syntactic or semantic features us-
ing elicitation tasks. If there is variability between languages in a particular
domain, non-linguistic cognitive tasks are designed which tap into this do-
main. Differences between communities on the cognitive task, which parallel
the linguistic differences, would indicate a correlation between language and
thought. To show that language is the causal factor driving this relationship,
many linguistic communities need to be compared to see if language is the
most reliable predictor among other alternatives such as ecology, subsistence
or industrialization. By now more than 20 cultures have been compared
on their habitual linguistic constructions to describe spatial relations and
their habitual cognitive strategies (Levinson, 2003b; Majid, Bowerman, Kita,
Haun, & Levinson, 2004). The comparison revealed that none of the alternat-
ive factors determine usage patterns in spatial descriptions across languages
(Majid et al., 2004). Since none of the alternative factors by themselves seem
to determine linguistic preferences, they are unlikely candidates for interven-
ing variables affecting both language and cognition. However, the contro-
versy is far from resolved (Li et al., 2005). Chapter 3 compares two cultures
which differ in the way they predominantly express spatial relations in lan-
guage and investigate the stability of differences in habitual spatial cognition
between the two cultural communities. Chapter 4 combines the approaches
of chapter 2 and 3 and uses cognitive cladistics to reveal inherited predis-
positions in human spatial relational cognition and, at the same time tests
whether behaviour in the very same paradigm used for non-human great apes
will vary across cultures. With the present findings, based on phylogenetic,
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ontogenetic and cross-cultural contrasts, I hope to open up the prospects
of a systematic evolutionary psychology based on the cladistics of cognitive
preferences and abilities and their comparison across human cultures.
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Chapter 2
Evolutionary psychology of spatial
representations
A version of this chapter has been published as D.B.M. Haun, J. Call, G. Jan-
zen & S.C. Levinson (2006). Evolutionary psychology of spatial representa-
tions in the Hominidae. Current Biology 16, 1736-1740.
2.1 Abstract
Comparatively little is known about the inherited primate background un-
derlying human cognition, the human cognitive wild type. Yet it is possible
to trace the evolution of human cognitive abilities and tendencies by con-
trasting the skills of our nearest cousins, not just chimpanzees, but all the
extant great apes, thus showing what we are likely to have inherited from the
common ancestor (Byrne, 1995). By looking at human infants early in cog-
nitive development, we can also obtain insights into native cognitive biases
in our species (Hespos & Spelke, 2004). Here we focus on spatial memory, a
central cognitive domain. We show, first, that all non-human great apes and
1-year old human infants exhibit a preference for place over feature strategies
for spatial memory. This suggests the common ancestor of all great apes had
the same preference. We then examine 3-year old human children, and find
that this preference reverses. Thus, the continuity between our species and
the other great apes is masked early in human ontogeny. These findings,
based on both phylogenetic and ontogenetic contrasts, open up the prospect
of a systematic evolutionary psychology based on the cladistics of cognitive
preferences.
2.2 Introduction
All species feeding upon dispersed resources in space and time need to re-
member locations and know how to find them. There are two main strategies
for remembering object-location: Using object-features vs. place as defined
by a spatial frame of reference. Earlier studies have examined the use of
place and feature cues in a range of species from goldfish to pigeons, humans
to rats. In tasks which allow the subject species to freely combine both kinds
of cues, all tested species seem able to use both kinds according to circum-
stance, although some seem able to combine both more readily than others.
However, in tasks which oppose the two kinds of cues, some species prefer
place- [e.g., fish (Vargas & Lopez, 2005; Bitterman, 1965), lizards (Day, Is-
mail, & Wilczynski, 2003), rats (Cheng, 1986; Morris, Hagan, & Rawlins,
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1986)) while others predominantly use feature-based strategies (e.g. toads
(Williams, 1967), chicks (Vallortigara, Zanforlin, & Pasti, 1990), human chil-
dren (Allen, 1999)]. No studies however have systematically tracked these
preferences across the phylogenetic tree. Here we investigated a complete
family, systematically examining this particular cognitive preference across
all the extant genera in the Hominidae (see Figure A.1), including humans
at two different ontogenetic phases.
2.3 Experiment
To examine spatial memory strategy across the Hominidae, we compared
the performance of all four non-human great apes (apes henceforth), pre-
linguistic human infants (1-year olds) and human children (3-year olds). We
used a simple object search task in which subjects had to choose between
using a place- or feature-based strategy.
Methods
Participants Twenty-five apes of four different species belonging to all
three non-human great ape genera Pongo: 5 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus),
Gorilla: 4 Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and Pan: 5 Bonobos (Pan paniscus) and
11 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) - were tested with this apparatus. There
were 9 males and 16 females ranging from 5 to 32 years of age. All apes
were housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center at Leipzig
Zoo (Germany). They were living in social groups with conspecifics and
had access to indoor and outdoor areas. During testing, the apes were fed
according to their daily routine four times a day on a diet of fruit, vegetables
and monkey chow; water was at their disposal at all times.
In addition, we tested twenty-six 3-year olds with a mean age of 42 months
(range: 38-46 months, M = 42.3; SD = 1.9) in local kindergartens. Twenty-
six human infants approximately 1 year old with a mean age of 54 weeks
(range: 52-56 weeks; M = 54.3; SD = 1.3) were recruited from the local
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community. In the two groups there were 12 girls and 14 boys each. All
children were native German speakers of normal ability range and came from
mixed socio-economic backgrounds.
Setup An imitation hollow stone, an imitation birds nest and a hollow
piece of wood were used as containers. All were approximately 15 cm wide
and placed on a plastic plank (70 x 40 cm) separated by 20 cm centre to
centre. An opaque plastic screen (70 x 40 cm) or a dark curtain was used
as an occluder. Apes received grapes or slices of banana as rewards whereas
children received small toy animals that they collected in a bag and returned
at the end of the session. The toys used as rewards with 1-year olds were
slightly bigger than those for older children to avoid risk of swallowing.
Procedure An experimenter (E) distributed three containers open side up
on a table. All three containers had distinct rich featural attributes. Subjects
observed while E produced the reward and inverted all the containers, so that
one of the containers hid the reward. The apparatus was then occluded, and
two of the containers were switched out of sight of the participant. In the
FEATURE condition the reward moved with the distinctive container, in
the PLACE condition the reward remained in its original place, now under
a different container. The place and feature conditions were administered in
two consecutive blocks for each individual, counterbalanced for order across
subjects. The transition between the two blocks was unmarked that is, the
strategy that had yielded rewards in the prior block suddenly no longer did,
while the alternative strategy was now the winning one. Randomly inter-
leaved within both blocks were control-trials in which all containers stayed
in their original location (the NO SWITCH condition). After these manip-
ulations (appr. 7 sec after presentation), the occluder was raised, and the
subject chose one of the three containers (no correction allowed), and got the
reward, if any, under it (Figure 2.1). All subjects were verbally encouraged
for a correct choice and children that did not immediately produce a response
were prompted with the words: “Can you find it? Show me!”. There were
no other verbal instructions.
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Figure 2.1: (Top) Adult orangutan male performing the task. (Bottom)
Experimental conditions. The ‘X’ indicates the hidden reward before and
after occlusion. PLACE: During occlusion the experimenter (E) switches
two containers while the reward stays in its original location. FEATURE: E
again switches two containers during occlusion but moves the reward with
its container.
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For older children and apes, each block was composed of 6 trials of one
of the two test-conditions (place or feature) and 3 no-switch trials. Thus,
subjects received 9 trials per block in two consecutive blocks for a total of
18 trials. We had to modify the procedure for younger children because
pilot testing had revealed that they presented a strong bias to choose the
middle position (Call, 2001). To avoid this problem, we removed the central
cup from the setup. As a result they received 4 trials per block in the two-
container setup (2 place trials, 2 feature trials, + 2 no-switch trials each).
We videotaped all trials and scored the container selected by subjects. Some
trials were excluded from analysis on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) The response was blocked from view on video; (b) The subjects left
their hands close to one of the response places during occlusion, thereby
predisposing a place-type response (1.9 % of all trials excluded in total); (c)
Three 3-year olds were excluded because they performed at least one block
without a single correct no-switch trial while one additional 3-year old was
excluded due to experimenter error; (d) Six 1-year olds were excluded because
they did not complete all trials. The sets of subjects reported above are the
final sets, after exclusions.
Results
Comparing the average number of correct trials, we first analyzed the differ-
ences among ape genera. A mixed ANOVA with condition (place / feature
/ no-switch) as within-subject factor and genera (Pongo / Gorilla / Pan)
as a between-subject factor revealed significant main effects for condition
(F (2,44) = 17.78, P < 0.001) and genus (F (2,21) = 3.73, P < 0.05). There
was no significant condition x genus interaction (F (4,44) = 1.325). No simple
post-hoc comparisons between genera reached significance. In tendency Pan
(M = 64.9; SE = 2.5) outperformed Gorilla (M = 52.9; SE = 5.0) and
Pongo (M = 54.0; SE = 4.5). Since we could not detect any differential
preferences for one strategy over the other between genera we collapsed all
apes for further analysis. (Table 2.1) presents the percentage of correct trials
in the three conditions for the remaining three groups).
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Table 2.1: Mean percentage (± SD) of correct trials in the three
experimental conditions (Place / Feature / No Switch) for each of the three
subject-groups.
Place Feature No Switch
M SD M SD M SD
3-year olds 30.9 24.7 50.9 32.0 75.6 15.8
1-year olds 71.2 25.2 46.2 28.0 72.1 20.4
Apes 60.4 27.5 35.7 16.8 86.0 17.8
Figure 2.2: Mean percent correct (± SE) for the place and feature conditions
only. Means are adjusted for the respective chance levels of the different
subject groups: 33.33% for 3-year old human children and apes (1 out of 3
containers) and 50% for 1-year old human infants (1 out of 2 containers).
Conditions marked with ‘*’ were significantly different from chance in one-
sample t-tests. Unmarked bars were not significantly different from chance.
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A mixed ANOVA (condition (place / feature / no-switch) x order (place first
/ feature first)) conducted for each group (apes, 1-year olds, 3-year olds)
separately, revealed a significant main effect of condition in all three groups
(apes: F (2,46) = 34.30; P < 0.001; 1-year olds: F (2,48) = 7.90, P < 0.01;
3-year olds: F (2,48) = 18.23, P < 0.001). However, the three subject groups
differed in their strategy preferences (Figure 2.2). Both 1-year olds and apes
performed better when the food stayed in the same location regardless of
the movement of the container (i.e., in the place condition) than when it
moved with its container (both P < 0.01, paired t-tests). For 1-year olds, a
one-sample t-test against chance (chance = 0.50) revealed that subjects were
significantly above chance in all conditions (P < 0.001) except feature (P >
0.4). The same pattern was detected in apes: A one-sample t-test against
chance (chance = 0.33) revealed that subjects were significantly above chance
in all conditions (P < 0.001) except feature (P > 0.4). In contrast, 3-year olds
performed better at retrieving the reward when it moved with the container
(i.e., in the feature condition) than when it stayed in its place (P < 0.05,
paired t-test). For 3-year olds, a one-sample t-test against chance (chance =
0.33) revealed that subjects were significantly above chance (P < 0.01) in all
conditions except place (P > 0.5). The p-values in all simple comparisons
between the conditions reported here and in the main text were calculated
and alpha-level corrected using a Bonferroni-Holm post-hoc test. Figure 2.2
presents a summary score obtained after subtracting the respective chance
levels for percent correct scores in the place and feature conditions.
A more detailed analysis looked at subjects’ choice of strategy rather than
their correct performance. We classified the subjects’ choices as place-based,
feature-based or errors (i.e. neither the selected location nor the container
had been rewarded before occlusion). An analysis of choices at switch-trial
‘one’ revealed that distributions match the error data. Distribution of first-
choice-strategy in older children differed significantly from that of 1-year olds
(Fisher-exact-test, P < .001) and apes (Fisher exact test, P < .001) which
were in turn very similar to each other (Fisher-exact-test, P > .5). While
3 year-old children tend to use a feature strategy on their very first switch-
trial, apes and 1-year olds initially chose place (Figure 2.3). Overall, the
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of subjects choosing to use either place or feature
cues to retrieve the reward on trial 1 of the experiment (before receiving any
feedback).
performance of young human infants and all other hominid genera showed
a similar pattern, which differed substantially from that observed in older
human children, who preferred to use feature rather than place information.
Since the data on children had shown that age had an effect on the propensity
to select place over feature, we also analyzed this aspect for nonhuman apes.
We calculated the percentage of switch trials in which subjects chose based
on place compared to feature. Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of trials
in which subjects chose place over feature. There was a significant increase
with age in the tendency to focus on place information (r = 0.62, n = 25,
P = 0.001). Subjects below 14 years of age selected place over feature on
average in 52.5% of the trials whereas this figure increased to 76.5% of the
trials for animals older than 14 years of age. There was no significant relation
between age and the percentage of errors committed by subjects (r = 0.05, n
= 25, P = 0.80). Although the age range in which we investigated children
and apes was not the same, the data suggest that human infants and apes
come initially to spatial tasks with the same place bias, but they diverge in
opposite directions, towards the feature strategy in the case of children, and
towards greater consistency in the use of place in the case of apes.
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Figure 2.4: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the percentage of
trials in which a subject chose place over feature and the subjects age for all
apes.
2.4 Discussion
Apes of four different species belonging to all three non-human great ape
genera Pongo: orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), Gorilla: gorillas (Gorilla gor-
illa) and Pan: bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) -
were tested in this study. In addition, human prelinguistic infants between
12-13 months and 3-year olds were tested. We show that all non-human
great ape genera share a preference for locating things in space in terms of
abstract place or position rather than in terms of the features of a container
object. Indeed, the continuities between human and ape spatial cognition are
striking: Apes and humans show similar ontogenetic development across the
Piagetian stages up to stage 6 (Antinucci, 1989), commit similar errors (Call,
2001), and can cope with a variety of object displacements (Tomasello & Call,
1997; Beran, Beran, & Menzel, 2005; Barth & Call, in press). Here we have
shown that at 1 year of age, humans exhibit just the same biases in spatial
cognition found in all other genera of the family (Figure 2.5). The standard
method of comparative cognition thus suggests a common phylogenetic in-
heritance of a preference for place-based spatial strategies from the ancestor
shared by all four genera. Object-location memory is a central cognitive
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Figure 2.5: Mean percent correct (± SE) for the place and feature conditions
for all ape genera and human 1- and 3-year old children. Means are adjusted
for the respective chance levels of the different subject groups (see Fig. 2.2).
No statistics were computed for the separate non-human genera because of
relatively small sample sizes in some of the groups. Qualitatively, Pongo,
Gorilla and Pan as well as 1-year old human infants all display a similar
pattern. In contrast, 3-year old infants show the opposite preference. Below
is the phylogenetic tree displaying the evolutionary relationships between the
four Hominid genera (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan, Homo).
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function underlying more complex foraging behaviour. Hence, this finding is
of considerable interest for the interpretation of the fossil record it suggests,
dominantly place-based foraging strategies in the common ancestor of the
Hominidae, which may thus have foraged in rather different ways than mod-
ern human hunter-gatherers: Place-based strategies are highly effective while
foraging within a stable territory; feature-based strategies are advantageous
while foraging in novel environments (e.g., finding mushrooms close to trees
of a particular species). Thus strategy preferences might indicate foraging
and lifestyle preferences. Through a comparative analysis of cognition across
a complete phylogenetic clade, we have been able to reconstruct behavioural
preferences in our common ancestor which cannot be found directly in the
fossil record.
We also find that human infants share the same cognitive preference as
apes, but this changes into a preference for features during early human on-
togeny. Why should three-year old children differ in their preferred spatial
strategy from human infants and other great apes? One possibility is that
1-year old human infants (as well as apes) lack certain cognitive abilities,
needed to solve a feature-based search task [e.g. response inhibition (Dia-
mond & Doar, 1989) or exhaustive search strategies (Perlmutter et al., 1981)],
which excel after the first year of life. However in previous experiments vari-
ous animal species (Bitterman, 1965; Meador, Rumbaugh, Pate, & Bard,
1987) and human infants (Bremner, 1978; Bushnell, McKenzie, Lawrence,
& Connell, 1995) demonstrated the ability to use feature cues to retrieve
hidden targets. In fact all of our subject groups tended to improve on their
dispreferred strategy at least when it was rewarded in the first block of tri-
als (Figure 2.6). Alternatively, the preference for place over feature cues for
spatial memory in 1-year olds and apes might not be due to a lack of ability
to solve the feature condition, but to a proclivity to use place- over feature-
based strategies whenever available. In that case, the switch in humans
would be due to reconstructive events in human ontogeny between the first
and the third years, which re-weigh preferences, not create abilities. Clearly
this is a period where much happens in cognitive development. Maybe most
prominently, infants are inducted into social life through the acquisition of
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interpersonal skills (Flavell, 1999), such as for example increasing under-
standing of others’ mental states and the acquisition of spoken language,
the combination of which open up the full affordances of human culture
(Tomasello, 2003). Language in particular has long been argued to play a
reconstructive role in human cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1962; Bru-
ner, 1964; Gentner, 2003; Spelke, 2003; Xu, 2002). Indeed, the first words
learnt by German children are nouns (Gentner, 1982), and nouns specifically
name bundles of object features, thus making featural specificity prominent.
In fact, previous research has shown naming to draw attention to featural
distinctions between objects in young infants (Xu, 2002; Xu, Cote, & Baker,
2005). Further experimentation would be needed to demonstrate a causal
role for language for the present task, e.g. by examining infants of the same
age but different language capacities. What the present data tells us is that
the ’wild type‘ in our family exhibits a proclivity for place over feature in
spatial tasks, and that humans reverse this early in childhood.
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Figure 2.6: Mean percent correct (± SE) for the first and second half of trials
in each block for the place and feature conditions only. Means are adjusted
for the respective chance levels of the different subject groups: 33.33% for
3-year old human children and apes (1 out of 3 containers) and 50% for
1-year-old human infants (1 out of 2 containers).
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Chapter 3
Covariation of spatial language and cognition
A version of this chapter has been submitted as D.B.M. Haun, C.J. Rapold,
G. Janzen & S.C. Levinson (submitted). Right might be wrong where West
is right: Spatial language and cognition covary across cultures.
3.1 Abstract
Here we explore cross-cultural variation in spatial cognition by comparing
Dutch and Namibian elementary school children in a spatial reconstruction
task. The two cultures differ in the way they predominantly express spatial
relations in language. In three experiments we investigate cognitive strategy
preferences across different levels of task-complexity and instruction. Our
data show a correlation between dominant linguistic spatial frames of refer-
ence and performance patterns in non-linguistic spatial memory tasks. This
correlation is fully robust already by age 8 and stable across an increase
of complexity in the spatial array. When instructed to use their respective
non-habitual cognitive strategy, participants were not easily able to switch
between strategies and their attempts to do so decreased their performance
levels. In the light of the current debate on cross-cultural variability of spa-
tial cognition, we suggest that language can play a role in inducing stable
preferences in cognitive strategy.
3.2 Introduction
There has been much controversy over what effect language has on other cog-
nitive functions. Some presume that basic concepts, such as space or number,
are ontogenetically antecedent to language, which merely expresses prior con-
ceptual understanding and therefore cannot change it (Fodor, 1975; Gleitman
& Papafragou, 2005; Pinker, 1994). Others claim that language can greatly
facilitate mental processing (Dennet, 1991; Vygotsky, 1962), and make avail-
able cognitive adaptations to specific social environments (Levinson, 2003;
Lucy, 1992). The latter position holds that cognitive concepts may be derived
from language and that at least parts of the conceptual space in a speaker’s
mind are restructured by exposure to language (Brown & Lenneberg, 1954;
Gentner, 2003; Whorf, 1956). Cross-cultural variation in language provides
a natural laboratory to test these claims. To date, cross-cultural effects pre-
dicted by language differences have been found for example in the cognitive
processing of colour (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000), number (Gordon,
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2004; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004) and time (Boroditsky, 2001).
Space, another central cognitive domain, has been an arena of controversy
(Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Li & Gleitman, 2002; Pederson et
al., 1998). Spatial language varies across cultures (Pederson et al., 1998).
The controversial question is whether these differences in spatial language
correlate with similar variations in spatial cognition. Despite evidence doc-
umenting these correlations (Mishra & Dasen, 2005; Neumann & Widlok,
1996; Pederson et al., 1998; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998), the controversy is
still far from resolved. In this paper, we first extract from the literature
the considerations that have led some researchers to disregard available data
and assume spatial cognition to be cross-culturally universal. The literature
suggests some methodological adjustments, which we then apply in a set of
experiments conducted in two cultures, reported in the second half of the
paper.
3.2.1 Schooling & Context
Comparing cognition across cultures, especially when comparing industrial-
ized and indigenous populations, brings with it the difficulty of controlling
for formal education (Mishra & Dasen, 2005) and testing context (Li & Gleit-
man, 2002). A good solution is to focus on elementary school children: they
have not yet diverged in educational level to the extent that their parents
have. In the experiments below we therefore compare two populations of
elementary school children who are both exposed to standard schooling in
their first language, testing situations, writing-systems and English. Both
populations were tested outdoors next to their school buildings, which were
of similar size and both oriented along an East-West axis. Both populations
received video instructions in their first languages.
3.2.2 Frames of Reference distinctions
Underlying linguistic descriptions of spatial arrays are coordinate systems
or frames of reference (FoR). They serve to specify the directional relationship
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Figure 3.1: Transcript of a Dutch and a }Akhoe HaiŞom speaker, describing
a photograph to another participant in a director/matcher task. In these
tasks, two speakers hold two identical sets of photographs. Without seeing
each other, the ‘director’ describes one of the pictures, while the ‘matcher’
attempts to find the corresponding photograph in his own set. Below the ori-
ginal texts are an interlinear transcript and the free translation into English.
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between objects, in reference to a shared spatial anchor (Levelt, 1996; Talmy,
1983). Extensive field research in over 20 languages, analyzing natural and
elicited conversation, revealed a threefold distinction of systems (Levinson,
2003): European languages such as English predominantly use a Relative,
viewpoint-dependent FoR with terms like front, back, left and right: “The
ball is to the left of the tree (from my point of view)”. Some languages, for
example Malaysian Jahai, predominantly use a coordinate system that makes
reference to facets of objects - an Intrinsic FoR: “The tree is at the front of
the house”. Other languages, like Guugu Yimithirr (Australia), predomin-
antly use a third, so-called Absolute FoR, in which linguistic descriptions use
cardinal-direction type systems such as our North-South-East-West - “Theres
an ant by your southern leg” (Figure 3.1).
Many cognitive psychologists however, operate with a two-way distinction
between FoRs: egocentric vs. allocentric. While egocentric (body-centered)
strategies, essentially match properties of Relative linguistic constructions,
allocentric (world-centered) responses collapse use of Absolute cardinal dir-
ections and Intrinsic strategies using local landmarks.
This three- vs. two dimensions mismatch poses a problem for the invest-
igation of the relationship between language and cognition and has led to
systematic misunderstandings (Levinson et al., 2002; Li & Gleitman, 2002).
For example, initial investigations suggested that speakers of Absolute lan-
guages prefer allocentric to egocentric spatial strategies (Neumann &Widlok,
1996; Pederson et al., 1998; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998). Participants were
asked to memorize spatial arrays; they were then rotated 180 ◦ before being
asked to reconstruct them. As a result, the space formerly to their left is now
to their right (north and south of course remain the same). In this way body-
centered (egocentric) responses can only be discriminated from others using
any environmental axis (allocentric) (Figure 3.2A). So in principle Absolute
speakers could have been producing Intrinsic rather than Absolute behavioral
responses, allowing a mismatch between spatial language and cognition.
Here, we factor out all three FoRs by using a 90 ◦ rotation of subjects
instead of 180 ◦. We also moved subjects to the opposite side of a salient
local landmark so that reference to a local landmark as opposed to Absolute
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Figure 3.2: A: Basic experimental setup in previous studies. Subjects are
presented with a spatial array, then rotated 180 ◦ degrees and asked to re-
produce it on a different table. In this setup, Intrinsic (arrow towards a
local landmark) and Absolute (south) responses are indistinguishable. B:
Schematic experimental setup for the current study (both in Millingen (The
Netherlands) and Farm 6 (Namibia)). Subjects are presented with a spatial
array on table 1, then rotated 90 ◦ and asked to reproduce it on table 2. In
this setup, all three frames of reference are distinguishable.
coordinates like North would become apparent (Figure 3.2B). Participants
could now mentally code the same toy as either being left, east or towards the
landmark of another toy, and the type of coding is, after rotation, transpar-
ent to the investigators. This paradigm matches three behavioral response
categories to the three existing linguistic FoRs, thereby allowing for a closer
investigation of the relationship between linguistic usage and cognitive cod-
ing.
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3.2.3 Task-complexity
Previous designs have tended to use very simple sets of stimuli (usually 2-3
objects at a time) to allow for detection of preferences in strategy choice.
But given a simple task, perhaps participants are free to solve it whichever
way they like in line with local cultural norms or behavioral preferences,
while underlyingly the set of options and the cognitive biases are invariant
(Li, Abarbanell, & Papafragou, 2005; Li & Gleitman, 2002). Thus, many
cognitive scientists have argued, following Kant (1768), that spatial cogni-
tion is fundamentally Relative (Halligan, Fink, Marshall, & Vallar, 2003;
Miller & Johnson-Liard, 1976). However, if cultural compliance requires Ab-
solute spatial strategies, the individual might achieve these by momentarily
overriding their natural tendencies consulting additional strategies such as
sub-vocal rehearsal (Munnich & Landau, 2003). Following this reasoning,
one might predict that, the harder the task, the less speakers might be able
to follow cultural norms. As a result, participants might fall back onto a
cross-culturally shared natural tendency. In the following experiments, we in-
vestigate this by increasing complexity of the array to see if it affects strategy
preference. Besides increasing task-demand, a complex array also minimizes
possible confounding effects of sub-vocal rehearsal in a non-linguistic task
for the following reason: Spatial language follows a pair-wise figure-ground
structure (Talmy, 1983), in which arrays of objects are described in pairs of
two, until all possible combinations are satisfied. Doubling the number of
items in an array does not simply result in double the necessary linguistic
units, but causes a combinatorial explosion. The more complex the linguistic
encoding becomes, the less suitable a sub-vocal linguistic strategy becomes
for memory encoding.
3.2.4 Instructions
In earlier studies (and Experiments 1 and 2), instructions were deliberately
kept general (they were of the kind ‘make the array again’), so that subjects
would use whatever preferred strategy comes naturally to them. But given
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an ambiguous task, subjects might do whatever they find culturally appro-
priate, which might drive the observed cross-cultural variation instead of the
proposed cognitive preferences (Li et al., 2005; Newcombe & Huttenlocher,
2000). If so, unambiguous instructions should easily sway participants to
alter their behavior. To test this we chose two cultural communities, which
have all three FoRs potentially available in their languages and differ only
in their usage patterns - Dutch and }Akhoe HaiŞom, as described below.
In experiment 3 below we instructed children of both communities in their
first language to use the FoR they do not habitually use. If cross-cultural
differences are merely varying interpretations of open tasks, and all cognitive
options are equally available, an instruction should easily produce opposite
response patterns.
3.3 Experiments
The following experiments were run in two culturally distinct populations,
Dutch and HaiŞom. The Duch participants came from a rural setting in the
Netherlands. Dutch speakers predominantly use Relative spatial relational
descriptions, but also deploy Intrinsic constructions. Cardinal directions are
sometimes used for large-scale spatial reference (Amsterdam is north of The
Hague) but never for tabletop space. The }Akhoe HaiŞom (HaiŞom for short)
are a cultural group of hunter-gatherers living in the savannah of Northern
Namibia. Their language is part of the Khoekhoe cluster within the Central
Khoisan language family. Besides a dominant Absolute system, speakers have
an Intrinsic and a rarely used Relative system with left-right-front-behind
terms (Widlok, 1997).1
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate earlier findings using a simple
spatial array and unspecified instructions. Experiment 2 was designed to
investigate the effects of task difficulty, to see if strategy preferences changed
using a complex spatial array and unspecified instructions. In Experiment 3
1An ethnographic description of the HaiŞom can be found in Widlok (1999) and on
http://www.mpi.nl/DOBES/projects/akhoe
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Table 3.1: Percentage distributions of strategy choice in Dutch and HaiŞom
in simple array trials without instructions (Experiment 1), complex array
trials without instructions (Experiment 2) and complex array trials with
instructions to use the non-preferred strategy (Experiment 3).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
simple Array complex Array complex Array
free free instructued
Dutch HaiŞom Dutch HaiŞom Dutch HaiŞom
Frames of Reference
Relative 91.67 0.00 100.00 0.00 41.67 16.67
Intrinsic 0.00 15.00 0.00 0.00 8.33 33.33
Absolute 1.67 85.00 0.00 100.00 25.00 50.00
Other 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00
we test whether participants are easily able to adopt any strategy to remem-
ber a complex spatial array when given clearly specified instructions (Table
3.1).
3.3.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate whether two cultures that vary
in their usage of linguistic expressions of spatial relations also, given un-
specified instructions, vary in their preferential cognitive coding of simple
spatial arrays, and whether potential cognitive preferences parallel the lin-
guistic preferences.
Methods
Participants Our sample consisted of 12 children from each of the Dutch
and the HaiŞom communities. The Dutch children (6 males, 6 females; mean-
age = 8;7 years, range = 8-9 years, SD = 6 months) were recruited from St.
Martinus School, Millingen aan de Rijn. HaiŞom children (8 males, 4 females;
mean-age = 8;7 years, range = 7-11 years, SD = 1;4 years) were recruited
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from |Khomxa Khoeda Primary School. All participants received rewards
for participation and teachers and parents gave their informed consent.2
Setup The task involved memorizing a spatial array, and then reconstruct-
ing it at a different location. In both cultures, two tables were placed on
opposite sides of the school building, a salient, familiar environmental land-
mark. A spatial array of toys was placed on table 1. Participants were always
facing South during memorization and were then guided around the North
side of the school to table 2 for reconstruction. Here, they were positioned
facing West, and thereby rotated 90 ◦ relative to their orientation at table
1. Participants’ spatial reconstructions of the array of toys were categorized
into one of four potential response categories:
1. Relative: The toys were placed maintaining their spatial relations rel-
ative to the participants viewpoint.
2. Intrinsic: The toys were placed maintaining their spatial relations to
the environmental landmark (school building).
3. Absolute: The toys were placed maintaining their spatial relations to
cardinal directions.
4. Other : The toys were placed not maintaining any of the spatial rela-
tionships of categories 1-3.
Procedure Participants were given a video-instruction in their first lan-
guage, which stated that an array of toys would be placed on a table and that
they were to pay attention, as these would be removed and they would have
to “make it again later”. A row of three out of four laterally symmetrical toy
animals (cow / pig / horse / sheep) was placed on table 1, all facing either
right or left of the participant (Figure 3.3A). The direction and identity of
2The experimenter was the first author, a bilingual German/English speaker. He in-
terfaced with the teachers in both communities in English and with children through
native-speaker video-instructions.
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Figure 3.3: Simple (A) and complex (B) array of toys used as stimuli in both
communities.
the animals were counterbalanced and randomized across participants. After
participants indicated that they had memorized the setup, the experimenter
removed the animals. In the first trial all four animals were simply placed
back in a pile in the middle of the same table (table 1) after a short delay.
All participants rebuilt the array correctly on the first attempt, picking the
right subset of animals and orienting them correctly. In the following five
trials, participants were guided to table 2 for their response. There, four an-
imals were again piled on the table. Responses were recorded on paper and
by photograph. Directional alignment of animals on each trial was coded
according to the four potential response categories. The experimenter never
gave any differential feedback. At the end of every trial, the participants
were guided back to table 1.
Results
The array-internal order of animals was used as an indicator of general per-
formance. Participants made few errors (% erroneous trials: Median = 0.0;
min = 0.0; max = 40.0). Analyzing the directional alignment of animals
on all trials, the populations differed significantly in their strategies (Fisher-
exact, p < .0001; all Fisher-exact tests were performed on frequencies, but
descriptive statistics are reported in percentages). While Dutch participants
mainly used a Relative FoR to reconstruct the animals (91.67% of all tri-
als across all subjects) the HaiŞom population mainly produced Absolute
responses (85%) (Table 3.1).
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Discussion
The children of the two cultures varied in their preferred cognitive strategy
for solving this spatial relational reconstruction task, with their preference
matching the preferred mode of description in the language (Widlok, 1997).
3.3.2 Experiment 2
To test if task-complexity would affect strategy preference, we presented
participants with a second, more complex array of toys, consisting of six
instead of three objects placed in a two-dimensional plane. If the difference
reported in experiment 1 is due to flexible processing of an overly simple
task, populations should differ less in their solutions to a more difficult task.
Method
Participants & Setup Participants and setup were identical in all exper-
iments, which were conducted one right after the other.
Procedure Participants were shown one of three different complex arrays
including six toys (see example Figure 3.3B) without additional instructions.
Order of complex arrays across experiments 2 and 3 was counterbalanced
across subjects. After they indicated that they had memorized the array, it
was removed and the experimenter guided them along the school building to
table 2 to reconstruct the array there (FREE). Responses were recorded on
paper and by photograph.
Across a 90 ◦ observer-rotation, transformations within a Relative, In-
trinsic or an Absolute FoR result in three different correct solutions (for
simple examples see Figure 3.2 B). Childrens responses were compared to
the three correct solutions in the three different FoRs. Differences between
the correct solutions and the constructed arrays, in either position or orient-
ation, were scored as errors. Children could make maximally 6 orientation-
and 5 position errors (the pig was always in the sty). Their performance was
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analyzed relative to the maximum number of 11 errors (%-possible-errors).
Whichever FoR was the closest fit (lowest error-score) to their response was
counted as their choice of strategy. This lowest error score was also used as a
measure of performance and later compared to experiment 3. Any response
with 2/3 or more of possible errors in any FoR was scored ‘Other’.
Results
Reconstructing the complex array, performance was worse than in experiment
1 (% possible errors: Median = 18.18, min = 0.0, max = 63.64). The
populations once again differed significantly in the distribution of strategy
choices (Fisher-exact, p < .0001). Dutch participants exclusively used a
Relative FoR to reconstruct the animals (100% of all subjects), while the
HaiŞom population exclusively produced Absolute responses (100% of all
subjects) in the FREE-condition (Table 3.1).
Discussion
In experiment 2 we used a more complex spatial array to increase task de-
mand and reduce any possible effects of sub-vocal rehearsal. Cognitive pref-
erences were unchanged when participants were free to choose strategy. We
did not detect any trend towards a shared, underlying ‘natural FoR in any
direction, as might have been predicted as task complexity increases. We
conclude that cross-cultural preferences are stable even in harder tasks.
3.3.3 Experiment 3
In this experiment we instructed children of both communities in their first
language to use the FoR they do not habitually use, but which is nevertheless
conventionally codable in their language. If cross-cultural differences are
merely varying interpretations of unspecified instructions, a clear instruction
should easily reverse response patterns.
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Methods
Participants & Setup Participants and setup were identical in all exper-
iments, which were conducted one right after the other.
Procedure Participants saw a video instruction in their first language,
which told them to use their non-habitual FoR. Dutch subjects were in-
structed to place, say, the Western objects back on the Western side of the
array, when they reconstruct it. HaiŞom children were told to place, say,
the rightmost objects back on the right-hand side of the array, when they
reconstruct it. Both instructions were recorded by native speakers of Dutch
and HaiŞom. We made sure the instructions were clear by getting feedback
from independent bilingual consultants of both communities. After viewing
the instructions participants underwent an brief training procedure in which
two toys were placed on table 1. Then the experimenter removed them and
subjects were rotated 90 around the same table. Now they were asked to
reconstruct the mini-array following the instructions they had just received.
When they mastered this test, they were again oriented South and presented
with a complex array. Before removing the toys, the experimenter asked the
participants to indicate which of the toys were on the Western side (Dutch)
or the right side (HaiŞom). If they failed, the experimenter named all four
directions for them. After moving to table 2, subjects were again asked to
indicate the axes of the instructed FoR in their new position and orientation.
In case of failure the experimenter again labeled the sides correctly. They
were then given the toys and asked to reconstruct the scene (INSTRUCTED).
Responses were recorded on paper and by photograph.
Childrens strategy choices were assessed in the same way as in experi-
ment 2. To measure their ability to follow the instructions, we compared
childrens responses to the instructed correct responses, i.e. Absolute for
Dutch and Relative for HaiŞom children. Differences in orientation and po-
sition of the objects between the correct and the reconstructed array were
scored as errors.
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Figure 3.4: Boxplot of error-scores in Dutch and HaiŞom in Complex-Array
trials without (free) and with instructions (instructed). The height of the
box represents the interquartile range of the sample. The black lines are
the sample medians. Whiskers extend to the minimum and maximum of the
samples. Descriptives statistics error-scores: Dutch: FREE: Median = 9.09,
min = 0.0, max = 63.64; INSTRUCTED: Median = 81.82, min = 18.18,
max = 100.00 HaiŞom: FREE: Median = 18.18, min = 0.0, max = 45.46;
INSTRUCTED: Median = 81.82, min = 45.45, max = 100.00.
64 Covariation of spatial language and cognition
Results
To see if instructions had an effect, we compared distribution of choices
between Experiment 2 in which participants could freely choose strategy
(FREE) and the instructed experiment 3 (INSTRUCTED) in both com-
munities. Dutch (Fisher-exact, p < .01) and HaiŞom (Fisher-exact, p < .05)
showed significantly different distribution of response types following the in-
structions (Table 3.1).
To test whether the instructions changed subjects performance, we com-
pared FREE and INSTRUCTED trials within and across populations. Both
populations performed significantly worse in the instructed condition than
in the free condition. (Wilcoxon-test: Dutch: Z (N = 12) = -2.83; p <
.05; HaiŞom: Z (N = 12) = -3.06; p < .01). Moreover, HaiŞom children,
freely choosing to respond in an Absolute FoR, outperformed Dutch chil-
dren following Absolute instructions (Mann-Whitney-U-test: U = 5.00; p <
.0005). Similarly, Dutch children, freely choosing to respond in a Relative
FoR, outperformed HaiŞom children following Relative instructions (Mann-
Whitney-U-test: U = 2.00; p < .0005). In all tests on error-scores, p-values
were corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Descriptive statistics
are reported in Figure 3.4.
Discussion
Only around half of the subjects displayed an attempt to adapt their be-
havior, and only one fifth of them successfully changed to a previously dis-
preferred strategy. Participants were not easily able to switch strategy on
demand, and their attempts to do so decreased their performance signific-
antly in both groups there were at least four times as many errors. In other
words, despite understanding the instructions, children struggled to repro-
duce the array using a strategy which they cognitively disprefer, and which
is only infrequently used in their language (Widlok, 1997). This was true
even though the instructed strategy was preferred by the other group, and
therefore not harder per se. We conclude that cross-cultural preferences are
not easily overcome.
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3.4 Conclusions
We have here investigated cross-cultural differences in spatial cognition and
their correlation with language differences by comparing two populations of
elementary-school children in carefully matched experimental setups.
Our task extended the commonly used, two-way distinction between pos-
sible FoR strategies (egocentric-allocentric) to a three-way distinction (Relative-
Intrinsic-Absolute) and thereby matched behavioral response-options to the
threefold discrimination of FoRs in natural language. Our data show a cor-
relation between the linguistic strategy dominant in the language and the
cognitive strategy used to process spatial relations. This correlation is fully
robust by age 8. The cross-linguistic differences were stable across an increase
of complexity in the spatial array, a manipulation designed to increase task
difficulty and at the same time reduce the efficiency of sub-vocal rehearsal.
We found no evidence for a common, underlying natural tendency towards
any FoR across the two communities. Using their own first language, we also
instructed speakers of both communities to use their non-habitual cognitive
strategy. Participants were not easily able to switch strategy on demand,
and their attempts to do so decreased their performance significantly. Dutch
children struggled to reproduce the array so that it preserved the cardinal
directions of the original stimulus, while HaiŞom children struggled to re-
produce the array so that Relative right/left/front/back constancies were
preserved.
The human brain supports Relative, Intrinsic and Absolute spatial cog-
nition (Burgess, Donnett, Jeffery, & O’ Keefe, 1999). Therefore linguistic
effects on cognition in this domain can never be a matter of capacity, but
only of preference and proficiency. The question at stake is not what people
can or cannot think, given a language preference, but rather about the kind
of cognitive coding they will use by default, and the ease or difficulty with
which other coding systems can be adopted. Of course correlations between
linguistic usage patterns and cognitive proficiency might be caused by a third
intervening variable that affects both. But a comparison of the environment,
dwelling and subsistence-mode of over 20 cultural communities revealed that
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none of these factors determine usage patterns in spatial descriptions across
languages (Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004). Since none
of these factors by themselves seem to determine linguistic preferences, we
consider them unlikely candidates for intervening variables affecting both
language and cognition. Instead we suggest that in order to be a function-
ing member of a linguistic group, one has to communicate using the con-
ventional semantic concepts and categories. To achieve this, non-linguistic
cognitive representations need to be aligned to support the locally preferred
linguistic categories. Over time, language will induce expertise effects in
the non-linguistic cognition that supports its use. There are several estab-
lished cognitive processes such as perceptual tuning (Goldstone, 1998), rep-
resentational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), chunking through lexical
packaging (Miller, 1956), and structure-mapping (Gentner, 2003) that could
account for linguistic effects on non-linguistic representations, which in turn
can have effects on the kinds of computations carried out by the cognitive
architecture (Bowerman & Levinson, 2001; Majid et al., 2004). Our results
therefore suggest that language can play a role in inducing strong, stable
preferences in cognitive strategy, and that these culture-specific preferences
are already in place by middle childhood. It follows that linguistic diversity
goes hand in hand with cognitive diversity, and a cross-cultural perspective
on human cognition should play a central part in understanding how variable
adult cognition is built from a common cognitive foundation.
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Chapter 4
Cognitive cladistics and cultural override
A version of this chapter has been published as D.B.M. Haun, C.J. Rapold,
J. Call, G. Janzen & S.C. Levinson (2006). Cognitive cladistics and cultural
override in Hominid spatial cognition. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 103, 17568-17573.
4.1 Abstract
Current approaches to human cognition often take a strong nativist stance
based on Western adult performance, backed up where possible by neonate
and infant research, and almost never by comparative research across the
Hominidae. But recent research suggests considerable cross-cultural differ-
ences in cognitive strategies, including relational thinking, a domain where
infant research is impossible due to lack of cognitive maturation. Here we ap-
ply the same paradigm across children and adults of two cultures and across
all non-human great ape genera. We find that both child and adult spatial
cognition systematically varies with language and culture, but that neverthe-
less there is a clear inherited bias for one spatial strategy in the great apes.
It is reasonable to conclude, we argue, that language and culture mask the
native tendencies in our species. This cladistic approach suggests that the
correct perspective on human cognition is neither nativist uniformitarian nor
‘blank slate’ but recognizes the powerful impact that language and culture
can have on our shared primate cognitive biases.
4.2 Introduction
Cognitive psychology has been centrally concerned with the nature of human
adult cognition and its development from infancy. It has largely treated this
as the emergence of a universal cognitive structure from innate sources that
can be glimpsed in infancy. Many of these processes have been traditionally
thought to be discontinuous with our nearest primate cousins. This picture
needs correcting in two main directions. First, adult cognitive strategies di-
verge according to expertise and culture in some quite fundamental domains
like color (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000), number (Gordon, 2004; Pica,
Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004) or spatial cognition (Levinson & Brown,
1994; Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Neumann & Widlok, 1996; Pederson
et al., 1998). Language seems to play an important role in this divergent
specialization of the intellect. Innate biases are thus masked by cultural and
linguistic divergence. Although neonate and infant research might throw
4.3 Cross-cultural variation 73
light on these biases, many cognitive abilities - for example those involved
in relational reasoning - are not fully developed before cultural effects take
hold. Second, continuities with our primate cousins should be presumed, and
efforts should be made to track them (Barth & Call, in press; Byrne, 1995;
Hauser & Spelke, 2004). The overall picture that then emerges is, we argue,
one in which human infants inherit many of the same cognitive preferences
and biases as our primate cousins, but then go on to build cognitive struc-
tures which may diverge in variable ways from this primate base under the
influence of language and culture (Vygotsky, 1962).
In this paper we focus on the cognition of spatial relations, which shares
the relational characteristics of many higher cognitive processes (Gentner,
2003). First, in part 1, we explore human cognition for spatial relations in two
cultures, examining both adults and children. As predicted by earlier work,
we find major divergence in the two cultural groups, parallel to linguistic
coding strategies. Such a result is compatible with a ‘blank-slate’ view of
human cognition, but it need not imply it. Spatial cognition is vital to all
foraging species and is served by phylogenetically conservative neural systems
(Burgess, Donnett, Jeffery, & O’ Keefe, 1999), so there are good reasons to
suppose an inherited substrate. The standard approach would be to look for
preferences in human infants, but relational thinking is a domain where it is
difficult or impossible to acquire insight into innate biases by infant research,
for the relevant cognitive skills do not mature till well after children learn
language, and with it all the baggage of culture. In experiments 2 and 3 we
therefore, additionally to European preschool children, look at mature apes
of all the other great ape genera to establish the inherited primate baseline
and moreover gain insight into the evolutionary history of spatial cognition.
4.3 Cross-cultural variation
Spatial relations provide basic framing structures for the encoding of events
(Burgess, 2002) and relational thought forms the basis for propositional struc-
ture, predication, understanding analogy and metaphor (Gentner, 2003; To-
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masello, 2003). Therefore spatial memory, and the relational learning it
requires, is central to human cognition. Children acquire relational thought
relatively late in ontogeny coeval with the acquisition of the relevant lin-
guistic expressions (Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Gentner, 2003). Because
of this co-emergence of cognitive and linguistic concepts of spatial relations in
children, it has been argued that the ontogeny of relational thought is tightly
interweaved with, or might even be dependent on, relational language (Gent-
ner, 2003).
Spatial relational language follows coordinate systems or frames of ref-
erence (FoR for short), which serve to specify the directional relationships
between objects in space, in reference to a shared referential anchor (Levelt,
1996). Extensive field research in over 20 languages, analyzing natural and
elicited conversation, has revealed that in language just three FoRs seem to
be employed, but that languages vary in the repertoire they code and also
in the habitual usage of FoRs (Levinson, 2003). Some languages use a Re-
lative, viewpoint-dependent FoR with terms like front, back, left and right:
“The ball is to the left of the tree” (from my point of view). Some languages
utilize an Intrinsic FoR, which makes reference to faceted objects “The ball
is at the front of the house”. Some languages use a third, so-called Abso-
lute FoR in which linguistic descriptions use cardinal-direction type systems
such as our North-South-East-West: “The hot water is in the northern tap”.
While Relative constructions are predominant in European languages, the
Absolute FoR is dominant for example in several indigenous languages of
Australia, Papua New Guinea, South-, Middle- and North America, Nepal,
India, Siberia, and South-West Africa (Levinson, 2003; Majid, Bowerman,
Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004).
Continuing investigations into the cognition of speakers of Absolute lan-
guages suggest that they prefer Absolute (world-centred) to Relative (body-
centred) strategies in simple non-linguistic spatial memory tasks, while the
reverse is found in European speakers of predominantly Relative languages
such as English or Dutch (Levinson & Brown, 1994; Mishra & Dasen, 2005;
Neumann & Widlok, 1996; Pederson et al., 1998; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998)
for critique see (Bloom & Keil, 2001; Li & Gleitman, 2002). In other words,
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language difference covaries with differences in cognitive strategy for non-
linguistic tasks.
Here we investigate spatial relational learning in two distinct cultural
communities: a Dutch village representing a typical western European, post-
industrial culture and }Akhoe HaiŞom, a Khoisan hunter-gatherer community
in Namibia. Both Dutch and }Akhoe HaiŞom (HaiŞom for short) languages
make at least residual use of all three FoRs in natural conversation. How-
ever, they differ in their language usage patterns. Speakers of Dutch almost
exclusively use Relative constructions to describe small-scale spatial rela-
tions (Pederson et al., 1998; Levinson, 2003). HaiŞom speakers in principle
have a Relative FoR available but they almost always use Absolute spatial
descriptions (Widlok, 1997).1 In experiment 1, we tested children at the
age of approximate emergence of the relevant spatial relational terms [7-11
years of age; (Brown & Levinson, 2000; Piaget, 1928)] in a feedback-learning
paradigm, with minimal verbal instructions to minimize cross-culturally vari-
ant translations and interpretations (Bloom & Keil, 2001). We also tested
adults in both cultures to see if differences where not only initial variations
of an emerging cognitive skill, but actually stable across the lifespan. On the
basis of earlier results (Levinson, 2003), we predicted that consultants from
the two distinct cultures which vary in their linguistic expression of spatial
relations would also vary in their habitual cognitive coding of spatial relations
1Germany and The Netherlands are post-industrial Western-European nations with
a mixed rural and urban lifestyle, inhabiting a densely populated landscape. German
and Dutch speakers predominantly use Relative spatial relational descriptions but also
deploy Intrinsic constructions. Cardinal directions are only ever used for large-scale spatial
reference (Amsterdam is north of The Hague) but never for tabletop space. The research
sites for the present paper are a village called Millingen aan de Rijn with roughly 6000
inhabitants and Leipzig, a German city with roughly 500000 inhabitants. The HaiŞom are
a group of hunter-gatherers living in the savannah of Northern Namibia. Their language is
part of the Khoekhoe cluster within the Central Khoisan language family. Despite political
and economical marginalization and loss of their traditional hunting and gathering land
to farmers, many aspects of HaiŞom traditional culture have been maintained, including
healing trance dances, hunting magic, a lunar calendar and an Absolute linguistic system
for spatial relations. Besides the dominant Absolute system in the language, the speakers
have an Intrinsic and a rarely used Relative system with left-right-front-behind terms
(Widlok, 1997). The research site for the present paper is a camp called Farm 6 in
Mangetti West, with some 200 HaiŞom. An ethnographic description of the HaiŞom can
be found in (Widlok, 1999).
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Figure 4.1: Experiment 1: Experimental setup in two consecutive example
trials. Ten exactly identical cups were placed on two tables (5 each). Parti-
cipants were watching while a target was hidden under the cup depicted as
white (HIDING). Then they moved to the other table and indicated where
they thought a second target might be hidden (FINDING). The three dif-
ferently striped cups show the different contingencies rewarded in the three
consecutive blocks of trials.
and that cognitive preferences would match the linguistic preference. Hence,
Dutch speakers should prefer Relative to Absolute cognitive strategies while
HaiŞom speakers should show the reverse pattern.
4.3.1 Experiment 1
We used a non-linguistic spatial relational learning paradigm to test if the
preferred linguistic FoR in a given language would predict the preferred cog-
nitive strategy. As subjects, we used four groups: Dutch children and adults,
and HaiŞom children and adults.
Methods
Participants The sample consisted of 12 adults and 12 children from both
the Dutch and the HaiŞom communities. (Dutch adults: 6 male, 6 female,
mean age = 23 years 1 months, range = 18-34 years, SD = 4 years 6 months;
HaiŞom adults: 3 male, 9 female, mean age = 21 years 10 months, range =
15-40 years, SD = 6 years 7 months; Dutch children: 8 male, 4 female,
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mean age = 8 years 6 months, range = 8-10 years, SD = 9 months; HaiŞom
children: 8 male, 4 female, mean age = 8 years 10 months, range = 7-11 years,
SD = 1 year 7 months). All 48 volunteers received rewards for participation
and teachers and parents gave their informed consent for Dutch and HaiŞom
children.
Setup Two small tables were placed next to each other with a solid opaque
screen in-between to separate them visually. Five identical cups where placed
on each table in a dice-five constellation (Figure 4.1). The setups varied only
slightly in size across groups. All participants but three HaiŞom adults where
tested in similar indoor contexts. The three adults where tested outdoors
close to their home village. The experimenters were the first and second
author. They interfaced with the teachers in both communities in English
and with participants through native-speaker video instructions.
Procedure Participants where instructed in their first language to find a
hidden target when prompted.2 At the beginning of a session, the parti-
cipant was positioned in front of table 1 facing the screen. They watched an
experimenter (E) place a target under one of the five cups (HIDING). Then
they where directed over to table 2, again facing the screen, so shifting their
orientation 180 ◦. Here they were prompted to indicate the cup under which
they judged the target would be found (FINDING). After their response E
turned over their cup of choice and, in case of an incorrect choice (choosing
any cup without a hidden target), the correct cup to allow volunteers to ad-
just their behavior to maximize hit rate. We scored the container selected
by subjects based on videotapes and/or in situ notes. Trial 2 started with a
new HIDING at table 2 after which participants moved back to table 1 for
FINDING. This procedure was iterated for a total of 30 trials (3 blocks of
10). After two correct responses with the target in the central position as a
training criterion, targets were hidden following three rules (Figure 4.1):
2Instructions: “Here you see a set of cups on a table. You will watch Daniel hide this
block under one of them. Then you will go to another table with another set of cups,
where you can search for a block. The game is to find the hidden block.” (abbreviated
translation into English).
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1. Relative condition: The hiding and finding cups maintained position
Relative to the viewpoint of the participant. If the HIDING cup was
close to her on her left hand side the FINDING cup was again the close
one on the left hand side after she rotated into her new position at the
other table.
2. Intrinsic condition: The hiding and finding cups maintained position
in relation to a salient landmark between the two tables, namely the
screen or E. If the HIDING cup was for example the one diagonally
across from E, the FINDING cup was again diagonally across from E
after the participant rotated into her new position at the other table.
3. Absolute condition: The hiding and finding cups maintained position
Relative to the larger, surrounding environment. If the HIDING cup
was the north-western cup, the FINDING cup was again the north-
western one after the participant rotated into her new position at the
other table.
Figure 4.1 makes clear the distinct position of the FINDING cup in each con-
dition. The three different conditions were administered to each individual in
three consecutive blocks of 10 randomized trials, counterbalanced for order
across subjects. The transition between the blocks was unmarked - thus the
prior winning strategy no longer worked, and a new one had to be learnt.
Randomly intermixed within all three blocks were 2 trials each, in which the
middle cup was the FINDING cup (Middle-condition). In these Middle-trials
all three rules lead to the same solution. Participants that did not at least
perform 50% correct on Middle-trials (cup in central position) were excluded
from the final analysis. In all side-trials (all but the middle-condition), par-
ticipants had a 2/5 chance to pick a FINDING cup, which was not related to
the HIDING-cup following any of the three rules mentioned above (Relative,
Intrinsic and Absolute). Subjects who did so not significantly below chance
level (binomial test: less than 6 errors out of 24 trials) were also excluded
from the final analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Mean percent correct (± SE) for the Relative and Absolute con-
ditions for both Adults and children in the Dutch and HaiŞom communities.
Means are plotted against chance level (20 %, 1 out of 5 cups).
Results
We conducted a mixed ANOVA with the within-subject-factor condition (Re-
lative / Intrinsic / Absolute / Middle) and the between-subject-factors lan-
guage (Dutch / HaiŞom) and age-group (adults / children). Analysis revealed
a main effect of condition (F (3,132) = 38.13, P < .001; % correct: Relative:
M = 51.27, SD = 5.1; Intrinsic: M = 51.31, SD = 4.3; Absolute: M =
57.57, SD = 4.3; Middle: M = 93.75, SD = 2.1). Bonferroni Holm post-hoc
test showed that overall subjects performed better in the middle condition
than in any other (Relative vs. Intrinsic: t(47) = -.01, P > .05; Intrinsic vs.
Absolute: t(47) = -.99, P > .05; Absolute vs. middle: t(47) = -7.52, P <
.01).
We also found a main effect of language (F (1,44) = 65.48, P < .001;
Dutch: M = 76.58, SD = 8.1; HaiŞom: M = 50.37, SD = 14.4). Dutch out-
performed Namibian participants, most likely due to more advanced formal
schooling. We found no significant effect for age-group (P = .08).
The ANOVA also revealed an interaction of condition x language (F (3,132)
= 14.23, P < .001; Dutch: Relative: M = 82.0, SD = 18.4; Intrinsic: M =
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64.4, SD = 25.6; Absolute: M = 60.7; SD = 26.9; Middle: M = 99.3, SD
= 3.5; HaiŞom: Relative: M = 20.6, SD = 16.0; Intrinsic: M = 38.3, SD
= 28.6; Absolute: M = 54.4, SD = 32.1; Middle: M = 88.2, SD =19.3).
For the condition x language interaction, we predicted a priori that the pre-
ferred linguistic FoRs would also constitute the preferred cognitive strategy
in comparison to the infrequently used one. So Dutch subjects should per-
form better in the Relative than in the Absolute condition and the reverse
should be true for the HaiŞom. Bonferroni-Holm post-hoc tests indeed reveal
this to be the case (Dutch: Relative vs. Absolute: t(23) = 3.76, P < .01;
HaiŞom: Relative vs. Absolute: t(23)= -4.08, P < .01) (Figure 4.2).
Discussion
In this experiment, we trained three response-options in a spatial relational
learning task, which match the threefold Relative-Intrinsic-Absolute discrim-
ination of FoRs in natural language. Our data show a correlation between
the habitual linguistic strategy and the preferred cognitive strategies to pro-
cess spatial relations: both children and adults were more accurate (made
less errors) and were faster to learn the FINDING pattern that matched the
FoR dominant in their language. This correlation is fully robust by age 8 and
persists into adulthood. In sum, Dutch and HaiŞom subjects varied in their
preferred cognitive strategy to solve a spatial relational learning task and
their preference matched the preferred mode of description in their respective
language. Clearly, human cognitive competence encompasses all three FoRs,
and indeed special neurocognitive systems seem to support each of them
(Burgess et al., 1999). Cross-cultural differences in spatial cognition there-
fore concern preference and proficiency, not absolute ability. Many things
might hypothetically fuel cross-cultural variation of spatial cognition in this
sense. Several potential sources have been proposed, such as group-cohesion
or lifestyle (Li & Gleitman, 2002), context (Gallistel, 2002; Li & Gleitman,
2002), and language (Levinson, 2003; Majid et al., 2004). The largest and
strongest body of evidence supports the latter theory (Levinson & Brown,
1994; Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Mishra & Dasen, 2005; Pederson
et al., 1998; Neumann & Widlok, 1996; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998), which
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proposes that cognitive categories and concepts are not necessarily universal,
but potentially variable and seem to align with cross-linguistically variable
semantics. To communicate about space, in a way appropriate within a
linguistic community, cognitive representations need to be aligned with ha-
bitual linguistic categories so that information is coded appropriately for later
linguistic use. Like other expertise effects, frequent use of a particular lan-
guage will train the cognitive system in the necessary underlying processing.
Whatever the right combination of factors might be that ultimately explains
the variation of spatial strategies across human groups, it will, in one way
or the other, be part of what we loosely call ‘culture’. However, cultural
variation in cognition does not of course exclude a rich inherited basis, even
in the variables in question. It is therefore reasonable to ask what the input
or cognitive default is in this domain for humans. Is the default spatial re-
lational strategy unset (the ‘blank slate’ view), or is it preset but malleable
enough to be overriden by cultural preferences?
4.4 Phylogenetic inheritance
Since relational cognition only fully develops late in ontogeny, there is no
infant data which can shed light on a default strategy preference. There
is, however, an alternative source of information from comparative cognitive
science (Byrne, 1995): If all genera of a phylogenetic family (in our case the
Hominidae) exhibit the same behavioral tendencies or cognitive biases, this
suggests inheritance from the common ancestor shared by all genera (in our
case Pongo, Gorilla, Pan & Homo; Figure A.1). It is also reasonable to
assume that any such tendencies shared by all non-human great ape genera
and any human population is most likely part of the primate inheritance
shared by all humans. In this second part of the paper we apply this cladistic
reasoning to investigate inherited preferences for coding spatial relations in
FoRs.
There has been a great deal of speculation about the inherited struc-
ture of spatial relational thought. Immanuel Kant argued that the human
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body provides the source of our basic intuitions about the nature of space
(Kant, 1768). In agreement, many cognitive scientists hold the assump-
tion that spatial cognition is fundamentally Relative or egocentric [(Miller
& Johnson-Liard, 1976; Halligan, Fink, Marshall, & Vallar, 2003; Wang &
Spelke, 2002); but see (Burgess, Spiers, & Paleologou, 2004; Waller & Hodg-
son, in press)]. However, there are some reasons to doubt this. It is true
that young infants initially, before they are fully mobile agents, display a
quite inflexible Relative bias (Bremner, 1978). But as soon as they have be-
come proficiently mobile and competent navigators [around 16 months of age
(Acredolo, 1988)], they successfully use non-Relative cognitive strategies. If
the two types of strategies are immediately compared, English-speaking chil-
dren, at least between 3 and roughly 5 years of age, are better at non-Relative
strategies than at Relative ones (Allen, 1999; Nardini, Burgess, Breckenridge,
& Atkinson, in press). Moreover, children learning an Absolute language ac-
quire the relevant linguistic expressions at least as early as children learning
a Relative language (Johnston, 1988; Piaget, 1928; Brown & Levinson, 2000;
Leon, 1994; Wassmann & Dasen, 1998).
Relevant data from other species is sparse - there is only scant evidence
for a preference for Relative vs. non-Relative cognitive strategies, although
what there is mostly suggests a non-Relative advantage [Chimpanzee (Men-
zel, 1973); rats (Ray & Heyes, 2002); cats (Fiset & Dore, 1996); but see dogs
(Fiset, Gagnon, & Beaulieu, 2000) and a gorilla infant (Visalberghi, 1984)].
However, none of these experiments, infant or animal, used a strictly rela-
tional paradigm. . Since prior research suggests that, at least 4-year olds
(Gentner, 2003) and chimpanzees, can process relational information (Kuhl-
meier, Boysen, & Mukobi, 1999; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1990) we
set out, in experiment 2 and 3, to determine whether there is a background
preference for Relative or non-Relative coding of spatial relations through all
great ape genera to see if they share a cognitive ‘wild-type inherited from a
common ancestor.
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 2: Experimental setup in two consecutive example
trials. Six exactly identical cups are placed on two tables (3 each). Parti-
cipants are watching while a target is hidden under the cup depicted as white
(HIDING). Then they move to the other table and indicate where they think
a second target might be hidden (FINDING). The two differently striped
cups show the different contingencies rewarded in one of two consecutive
blocks of trials.
4.4.1 Experiment 2
This experiment is precisely analogous to experiment 1, conducted on adults
and children in two communities.
Methods
Participants the final sample included 12 German preschool-children (6
male 6 female, mean age = 4 years 10 months, range = 4 years 10 months
- 4 years 11 months), 3 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), 2 gorillas (Gorilla
gorilla), 3 bonobos (Pan paniscus) and 5 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) par-
ticipated in this experiment. Amongst non-human great apes, there were 4
males and 9 females ranging from 8 to 28 years of age (M = 14.17 years;
SD = 6.76 years). All apes were housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate
Research Center at Zoo Leipzig (Germany). They lived in social groups with
conspecifics and had access to indoor and outdoor areas. During testing, the
apes were fed according to their daily routine four times a day on a diet of
fruit, vegetables and monkey chow; water was at their disposal at all times.
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Setup The setup was similar to experiment 1 with the exception that the
number of cups on each table was reduced to 3 (see procedure). The cups
where arranged equidistant in a straight from left to right of the participant
(Figure 4.3). The experimenter was the first author. There were no instruc-
tions beyond the request to move to the other table and an invitation to
search.
Procedure To adapt it to the shorter attention span of our non-human
participants, and because of their known limitations with respect to abstract
reasoning (Call, 2004), we have simplified the conditions as follows. In con-
trast to experiment 1 the Intrinsic and Absolute conditions are collapsed
(Figure 4.3). The three identical cups in a straight line only offer two altern-
ative strategies: The Relative one and a non-Relative one, which could be
based on either Intrinsic or Absolute cues. The two conditions were admin-
istered in two consecutive blocks of 12 randomized trials for each individual,
counterbalanced for order across subjects. The transition between the blocks
was unmarked, as before. Randomly intermixed within blocks were 4 trials
each in which the middle cup was the FINDING cup (Middle-condition). In
these Middle-trials both rules lead to the same solution. Participants that
did not at least perform 50 % correct on Middle-trials (cup in central posi-
tion) were excluded from the final analysis (3 excluded). In all side-trials (all
but the middle-condition), participants had a 1/3 chance to pick a FIND-
ING cup, which was not related to the HIDING-cup following a Relative or
non-Relative rule. Subjects who did so 50% of the time or more were also
excluded from the final analysis (8 excluded).
Results
We used a mixed ANOVA to analyze the effect of the within-subject factor
condition (Relative / non-Relative / Middle) and the between-subject factor
genus (Pongo / Gorilla / Pan / Homo) on the percentage of trials in which
subjects found the reward.
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Figure 4.4: a: Experiment 2: Mean percent correct (± SE) for the Relative
and non-Relative conditions for all great ape genera. Means are plotted
against chance levels (33 %, 1 out of 3 cups) and mapped to the taxonomic
tree below (see also Figure A.1). b: Experiment 3: Difference in choice of
Relative and non-Relative cups between Baseline and Test-trials, mapped to
the taxonomic tree below (see Figure A.1).
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The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition (F (2,42) =
13.96; P < .001; Relative: M = 27.5, SD = 16.5; non-Relative: M = 49.5,
SD = 21.8; Middle: M = 67.0, SD = 21.0).
The planned simple comparison between the Relative and non-Relative
conditions was conducted using a paired sample t-test and the P -value cor-
rected for multiple comparisons according to Bonferroni-Holm. Apes per-
formed better when the finding-container maintained the hiding-container’s
spatial relations to the surrounding environment than to the participants’
own body-axis (Relative vs. non-Relative: t(24) = 4.07; P < .001). We
detected no significant main effect of genus (P = .67) and no interaction (P
< .25). Trends in the descriptive statistics show a similar pattern across all
ape-groups (Figure 4.4a).
Discussion
Processing small-scale spatial relations between objects, apes deploy envir-
onmental layout more readily than self. Despite common expectations, this
data indicate that Hominid spatial cognition is at least not always primarily
egocentric.
4.4.2 Experiment 3
Although experiment 2 shows that apes are able to solve spatial relational
tasks, their performance was at a low level. Previous literature has shown
that abstract rules in general put considerable constraints on great apes’
performance (Call, 2004). In experiment 3 we used the identical setup to
experiment 2 but used a design in which there is no necessity for complex
abstract rule learning.
Methods
Participants The final sample included 2 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus),
5 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), 4 bonobos (Pan paniscus) and 6 chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes). There were 6 males and 11 females ranging from 8 to
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Figure 4.5: Setup and procedure in Experiment 3: When the animal entered
the testing room it was directed to table 1. Here it had 10 trials in which all
three cups where rewarded (a: Baseline). Then the animal was directed to
table 2 and the experimenter started rewarding only one of the three cups
until the animal would pick this particular cup 10 out of 12 times in a row
(b: Training). When the animal hit criterion it was directed back to table 1
and again chose 10 times with all three cups rewarded in all trials (c: Test).
We compared choice distributions between Test- and Baseline-trials.
29 years of age (M = 14.88 years; SD = 7.88 years). All apes were part
of the same population described above. Of the original sample 4 animals
were excluded because they chose the same cup ≥ 90% of all trials across all
sessions and 1 animal due to experimenter error. If in the TRAINING section
of a session (see Procedure), an animal did not choose the training-cup 10
out of 12 times in a row within 60 trials, the session was terminated and
excluded from the analysis. Of a total of 51 sessions 4 had to be excluded
due to a failed criterion and 3 due to experimenter error.
Setup The setup was the same as in experiment 2. The experimenter was
the first author.
Procedure We induced a strong spatial response bias for one of three
identical cups by training apes to pick one particular cup from a lateral
array of three. We then investigated how this response bias would manifest
itself when the subject is rotated 180 ◦. Suppose the training induces an
expectation of reward under the leftmost cup. When the animal is rotated,
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if the bias has been conceived of in egocentric terms, it should choose the
leftmost cup; if on the other hand the animal has conceived of the array using
allocentric coordinates, it should choose the rightmost cup (Figure 4.5c). In
this way, rather than learn an abstract rule, the animal simply had to express
its interpretation of the training bias.
Every animal went through three test-sessions on three different days.
When the animal entered the testing room it was directed to table 1 (Figure
4.5). Here it had 10 trials in which all three cups where rewarded (Baseline,
Figure 4.5a). We recorded the distribution of choices across the three con-
tainers. We scored the container selected by subjects based on videotapes
and/or in situ notes. After the initial 10 trials the ape was directed to table 2,
where again for 10 trials all three cups where rewarded to avoid two different
game-contexts for the two tables. Then still at table 2, E started rewarding
only one of the three identical cups for all trials to come, until the animal
would pick this particular cup 10 out of 12 times in a row (Training, Figure
4.5b). Every animal participated in one session for each of the three potential
‘training-cups’ on table 2. The order of sessions was counterbalanced across
subjects. When the ape hit criterion (10 of 12 correct choices in a row) it
was directed back to table 1, thus undergoing 180 ◦ rotation, and again chose
10 times with all three cups rewarded in all trials (Test, Figure 4.5c). Again
we recorded the distribution of choices across the containers.
Results
For statistical analysis we subtracted Baseline from Test choice-percentages
for each cup to isolate effects of Training. As a manipulation-control, we
first analyzed the session in which the middle cup was the training-cup on
table 2 (Middle-sessions). If any training bias translated from table 2 back
to table 1, the percentage of trials in which animals pick the middle cup
should increase from baseline to test trials in Middle-sessions and therefore
Test - Baseline > 0. A one-sample t-test against zero revealed a significant
increase in percentage of middle cup choices on table 1 after it was repeatedly
rewarded on table 2 (t(14) = 4.17; P < .001; M = 22.00; SD = 20.42).
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To further see if apes preferred a particular strategy we analyzed sessions
in which one of the Side cups was rewarded during training on table 2 (Side-
sessions). We subtracted percentage of choices on Baseline- from those on
Test-trials for those cups, which either preserved the Relative or the non-
Relative characteristics of the trained cup. We computed the average value
across the two Side-sessions and conducted a mixed ANOVA with the within
subject factor FoR (Relative / non-Relative) and the between-subject factor
genus (Pongo / Gorilla / Pan). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of FoR
(F (1,13) = 11.1; P < .01; Relative: M = -15.63; SD = 22.9; non-Relative: M
= 21.25; SD = 17.5), no main effect of genus (P = .74) and no interaction (P
= .86). Post-hoc one-sample t-test against zero (Bonferroni-Holm-corrected)
revealed that animals chose the Relative cup significantly less in Test than in
Baseline trials (t(15) = -2.73; P < .005), while they chose the non-Relative
cup significantly more often in Test- than in Baseline-trials (t(15) = 4.87;
P < .001). This combination of results indicates a non-Relative translation
of response bias. Trends in the descriptive statistics show a similar pattern
across all genera (Figure 4.4b).
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated great apes‘ preference to use environmental cues in
contrast to self in a less demanding task. Taken experiment 2 and 3 together,
all great ape genera prefer to process spatial relations based on environmental
cues and not self. The standard methods of comparative cognition thus
suggest a common phylogenetic inheritance of a preference for non-Relative
spatial strategies from the ancestor shared by all four existing genera of
Hominidae (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan and Homo). Based on this result we argue
that at least for small-scale spatial relations, the inherited cognitive mode of
operation is not, as argued by Kant and others, egocentric, but preferably
deploys environmental cues as common reference between objects.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we combine research on intra-human variability and inter-
Hominidae continuities to understand human cognition in its roots and vari-
ability. We compared humans with different cultural backgrounds and non-
human great apes in a domain, spatial relations, accessible and highly relev-
ant to all tested species. Experiment 1 showed that human spatial relational
learning varies cross-culturally and that habitual cognitive preferences covary
with habitual usage patterns in natural spatial language. This correlation is
fully robust by age 8 and persists in adult-hood.
In experiment 2 and 3 we tracked the functional signature of spatial re-
lational learning through all great ape genera, i.e. right across the whole
Hominidae family including representatives of Pongo, Gorilla, Pan and Homo
(European 4-year olds). All genera prefer environment- to self-centred pro-
cessing of spatial relations. The standard methods of comparative cognitive
science suggest a common phylogenetic inheritance of a preference for envir-
onmental or allocentric over egocentric spatial strategies from the ancestor
shared by all four genera. This conclusion upsets the Kantian assumption of
the priority of egocentric spatial reasoning, but it does so on firm empirical
grounds.
This inherited bias towards the allocentric coding of spatial relations, can
be overriden by cultural preferences, as in our own Western preference for
egocentric or Relative spatial coding. This override is not a rare or typic-
ally European phenomenon. Relative languages have been documented in
industrial and indigenous cultures all over the globe (Majid et al., 2004),
including for example the speakers of Kgalagadi, a Bantu language, who
live a mere few hundred kilometers from the HaiŞom language area (Neu-
mann & Widlok, 1996). Nevertheless, overriding the bias might be expected
to incur some costs - thus the theory makes predictions about the relat-
ively greater difficulty of acquiring a predominantly egocentric coding system.
First, some individuals might be expected to have some special difficulties
- prima facie evidence comes from lifelong difficulties with ‘left’ and ‘right’
that some adults evidence (Elze, 1926). Second, the relevant linguistic spa-
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tial relational constructions may be expected to be learnt later by children.
Again, the evidence suggests this is correct: children in cultures were Abso-
lute coding is predominant, seem to master this as early as 4, and certainly
by 7 years of age (Wassmann & Dasen, 1998; Brown & Levinson, 2000; Leon,
1994), while children in Relative coding cultures do not seem to master full
use of left/right systems till around 11 (Piaget, 1928).
The model for human cognition that we propose then has a rich, inherited
primate basis, which may be masked by language and culture. Our primary
access to these underlying defaults is through the study of our nearest primate
cousins. The model does not suppose that language and culture can neces-
sarily build cognitive structures entirely de novo - in the domain of spatial
relations at least, all three frames of reference have clear neural substrates
[Relative: posterior parietal cortex (Cohen & Andersen, 2002); Intrinsic: sup-
plementary eye-fields (Olson & Gettner, 1995); Absolute: hippocampus and
entorhinal cortex (O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996; Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, Moser,
& Moser, 2005)], and these perhaps exhaust the available alternatives. The
model makes predictions about differential human performance in the condi-
tions where culture overrides an inherited default strategy. It places cladistic
reasoning at the heart of an evolutionary psychology. We hope this perspect-
ive will supercede the very limited rhetoric of the controversies (Duchaine,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2001; Pinker, 1994, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992)
which pit a simple nativist account of human cognition, admitting no cross-
cultural variation, against a naive ‘blank-slate’ approach, which admits no
strong phylogenetic inheritance behind human cognition.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
At the beginning of this thesis it was argued that in order to appre-
ciate the distinctive hallmarks of human cognition we need to understand
both the continuities and discontinuities within Homo sapiens and across all
Hominidae. In an attempt to gain some insight into both, continuities and
discontinuities, three chapters were presented contrasting great ape species
(chapters 2 and 4), humans of different age groups (chapters 2 and 4) and
humans with different cultural backgrounds (chapters 3 and 4). Findings
of each experiment were presented and discussed within each chapter. The
beginning of each of the following sections will provide in italics summarizing
theses, expressing the general findings about continuities and discontinuit-
ies across species, age and cultures, reported in this dissertation. The body
of the sections places these findings in the context of current theory and
suggests directions for further research.
5.1 Continuities
Are there inherited defaults for spatial cognition in humans?
By ways of taxonomically informed cross-species comparisons we can recon-
struct the cognitive architecture of their common ancestor. The ancestral
cognitive predispositions are inherited by all extant species, representing a cog-
nitive ‘wildtype’. The cognitive wildtype for spatial cognition in all great apes,
including humans, preferentially deploys place over feature cues to retrieve
hidden targets and environmental cues over self to code spatial relations.
The present thesis demonstrates an experimental approach to the in-
herited defaults of human spatial cognition and reveales a first glimpse at
their structure and flexibility. There is a long standing discussion in de-
velopmental psychology as to whether cognitive capacities are hardwired in
human brains at birth, and if yes, how many there are, which ones and to
what exact extend they are predetermined (Elman et al., 1996; Fodor, 1985;
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994;
Pinker, 2002; Newcombe, 2002). The currently more prominent theoretical
camp, nativism (Spelke, 2003; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Pinker, 1994, 2002),
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claims that humans are born with a set of genetically controlled, informa-
tionally encapsulated processing units (modules), and preset developmental
programs, which unfold throughout ontogeny (Fodor, 1975, 1985; Spelke &
Newport, 1998). Hence, cognitive structure is universal across humans and
experience irrelevant for cognitive development (Spelke, 2003). The innate
modular structure of human cognition changes during ontogeny in two ways:
Either through new, previously dormant modules coming online (Fodor, 1985;
Scholl & Leslie, 1999) or through the combination of modularly processed
information by means of combinatorial semantics (Hermer & Spelke, 1996;
Spelke, 2003; Carruthers, 2002). In opposition, empiricists (Elman et al.,
1996; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Newcombe, 2002) claim that humans are born
with a set of general multi-purpose cognitive mechanisms, which potentially
subserve a multitude of functions. These mechanisms react to the environ-
ment of the developing child, adapting to the surrounding problem space. To
the extant that all humans are faced with almost identical problems during
ontogeny (language, locomotion, gravity, support, etc.), cognitive structure
may be expected to be universal across humans (Brown, 2004).
Challenges to both schools of thinking have taken several forms in the
past, being either based on overarching theoretical arguments (Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Pinker,
2002) or methodological critiques of specific empirical findings (Bogartz, Sh-
inskey, & Speaker, 1997; Learmonth, Nadel, & Newcombe, 2002; Vargas &
Lopez, 2005; Mix, 2002; Hespos & Spelke, 2004). As a result it becomes
clear that nativism and empiricism are two extreme ends of a theoretical
continuum and of great value as points of departure for empirical discussion.
The truth, however, as it does so often, lies somewhere in between these
two accounts. Human development must partly rely on both: Inherited pre-
specifications and environment; Nature and Nurture. And most empiricists
(Elman et al., 1996; Newcombe, 2002), and a little more reluctantly nativ-
ists as well (Spelke, 2003; Carruthers, 2002) will agree to an interactionist
account of some form. But what form? The problem with the interactionist
position is that the proposed interactions are either too trivial to be of any
major interest or too complex to be empirically testable (Elman et al., 1996).
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This is one of the points where this thesis will hopefully contribute to
the field, by demonstrating the need for a controlled comparison of species
and age groups in order to get a better handle on the inherited structure
of human cognition. Chapters 2 and 4 presented data from all genera of
our phylogenetic family (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan & Homo) and showed that
they share behavioural preferences on spatial memory tasks. Since all gen-
era exhibit the same behavioral tendencies or cognitive biases, this suggests
inheritance from the common ancestor shared by all genera. Any such tend-
encies shared by all non-human great ape genera and any human population
are most likely part of the primate inheritance shared by all humans and
therefore part of the inherited predispositions of the human mind. In the
case of spatial cognition, there seem to be inherited preferences in humans.
However, claiming something to be ‘inherited’, does not explain how it comes
about. From the data at hand, it is impossible to tell if it is an actual genet-
ically coded cognitive preference, or the inevitable outcome of an interaction
between genes and environment during the first few months of human on-
togeny. So inherited defaults, revealed by means of cognitive cladistics, do
not necessarily support either nativist or empiricist theories. In fact, ge-
netic control and environmental influence are not necessarily contradictory
mechanisms at all. Epigenetic developmental phenomena, meaning factors
influencing cell-fate which are not coded in the DNA, are well documented
in Biology. But these epigenetic effects might in turn be triggered by genet-
ically coded mechanisms. Genes may partially set up environmental (e.g.,
chemical) gradients that then channel further cell development. In a similar
way, environmental stimuli may channel the particular course of cognitive
development. The empirical task ahead is not to attempt to prove one the-
oretical extreme or the other, but to explore these complex interactions and
understand how they constrain outcomes.
In the future, cognitive cladistics should be applied to similar data-sets to
scope other cognitive domains such as causality, social learning or symbolic
thought, in order to slowly carve out a more complete picture of the human
cognitive wildtype. However, the power of the cognitive cladistics approach
does not end with the detection of common cognition, but maybe even more
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interesting, it can detect outliers. By comparing a complete and extensive
set of species with common ancestry, one of the tested species might turn
out to diverge from the majority. Species might have undergone special
evolutionary adaptations, unique to their evolutionary past, and distinct from
those of the other members of the family. The resulting cognitive abilities
and preferences are unique to this species amongst its relatives. We can ask
questions such as: Which cognitive abilities make chimpanzees chimpanzee,
orangutans orangutan and humans human? The most common approach
to find out whats uniquely human, has been to compare human children to
chimpanzees. But how do we know that any given difference is not uniquely
chimpanzee, while humans share their version of the trait with the rest of
the great apes? Controlled cognitive cladistics will not only be able to tell
us who shares what with whom, but also who doesn’t.
5.2 Discontinuities
Are inherited defaults for spatial cognition in humans affected by
uniquely human capacities such as language?
Language, in one way or the other might reorganize inherited cognitive predis-
positions in early human ontogeny. Language might also introduce cognitive
diversity. Human cognition is not always universal. Not even all those parts
we inherit from our evolutionary ancestors.
Chapter 1 posed the question whether uniquely human cognitive abilities,
such as language, could mould or restructure our inherited cognitive predis-
positions. Chapter 2 compared children before and after the critical period
of language acquisition. While young infants share the cognitive preferences
of the other great apes, older children show the opposite preference. It seems
that the human cognitive wildtype can be restructured, in this case even
inverted, during this critical phase of human ontogeny. Both, nativists and
empiricists have discussed similar effects. For example, in two recent over-
view papers (Newcombe, 2002; Spelke, 2003), one by a nativist (Spelke, 2003)
argued that the combinatorial semantics of natural language can recombine
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information processed in innate modules, while the other, by an empiricist
(Newcombe, 2002) argued that any experience (and this must logically in-
clude language exposure) might be part of the environmental influence on in-
nate general multi-purpose cognitive mechanisms. So both authors conceded,
directly or indirectly, that language might affect development, however, both
authors assume these effects on cognition to be universal across humans, be-
cause all human children acquire language (Spelke, 2003; Newcombe, 2002).
This deduction, I argue, is not necessarily valid. While it is true that all nor-
mally developing children will acquire language and therefore some general
effects of language on thought might be universal to humans, languages vary
in their structure and content and might impose specific effects on thought
which might then result in cognitive diversity across cultures.
Chapters 3 and 4 presented data from two extremely different human cul-
tural groups: Dutch and HaiŞom. The two groups differed profoundly in their
cognitive preferences for processing spatial relations. While Dutch subjects
preferred to use themselves as a spatial anchor point, HaiŞom adults and
children preferred to use a cardinal-direction type system. This difference
resembles the habitual linguistic coding prevalent in the two languages. The
cross-cultural differences in cognitive preferences persisted across an increase
of task-demand and were not easily overcome by subjects at will. Both above-
mentioned review-papers (Spelke, 2003; Newcombe, 2002) underestimate the
variability of human cognition, although they do so for completely different
reasons. Spelke (2003) assumes human cognition to be universal because it
is the result of a universal, predetermined development from universal in-
nate sources. Newcombe (2002) argues that human cognition is universal
because it is the inevitable outcome of the interaction between a flexible
organism and a universal environment. In contrast to both accounts, the
present data show that variable adult cognition rests on a common inherited
foundation responsive to variable environments. In chapter 4 I propose a
model, which assumes strong inherited biases and preferences in human cog-
nition and the abilities to override those to adapt to cultural specifications.
Even in a domain such as spatial cognition, where there exists an inherited
primate wildtype in humans, culture, mediated by language, can overpower
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predispositions. Culture allows fast adaptations to variable ecologies and
these adaptations include the redistribution of cognitive preferences. In the
coming years this model should be fleshed out by answering some questions
such as: Can culture override the wildtype in other cognitive domains? Does
the wildtype still exist in culturally ‘reformed’ adults, or is the override thor-
ough and permanent? Are the abilities that are needed to override cognitive
predispositions uniquely human?
As well as cognitive cladistics, cross-cultural psychology yields additional
power not brought to bear in this thesis. While chapters 3 and 4 only demon-
strated differences between cultural groups, cross-cultural comparisons might
also reveal commonalities and even universals. What constitutes universal-
ity is not very well defined in cognitive psychology, for the simple reason
that psychologist tend to assume universality of their findings in the first
place. The documentation of cognitive diversity, such as in chapter 3 and
4 poses a theoretical challenge to that assumption and an even greater em-
pirical challenge to cognitive psychology as a whole. In fact, many psycho-
logical functions that were assumed to be universal turned out not to be:
Memory for and categorization of focal colours (Roberson, Davies, & Dav-
idoff, 2000; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2004), category-based
inductive reasoning (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002),(Medin
& Atran, 2004), perceptual illusions (Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1963),
eye-movements in scene-perception (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005), tem-
poral concepts (Boroditsky, 2001), numerical reasoning (Pica, Lemer, Izard,
& Dehaene, 2004; Gordon, 2004), spatial reasoning (Levinson, 2003), pre-
ferred decisions in the ultimatum game (Henrich et al., 2005), independent
self-concepts (Markus & Kitayama, 1999), the similarity-attraction effect
(Heine & Renshaw, 2002), the fundamental attribution error (Choi, Nis-
bett, & Norenzayan, 1999), the prevalence of major depression (Weissman
et al., 1996), noun bias in language learning (Tardif, 1996), and moral reas-
oning (Miller & Bersoff, 1992). This list is not by any means exhaustive
[for more see: Norenzayan & Heine, (2005)]. The abundance of cognitive
non-universals and the minimal amount of experimentally established uni-
versal cognitive functions [e.g., quantity sense (Dehaene, 1997); geometrical
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intuition (Dehaene, Izard, Pica, & Spelke, 2006)] should make cognitive sci-
ence step back and consider what kind of cross-cultural evidence is needed
to empirically establish a human universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).
The question what makes humans human has always played centre-court
in all cognitive sciences. Very recently the European Community has es-
tablished major funding schemes under the label “What does it mean to be
human?”. To a cognitive psychologist this question roughly translates like
this: What are the mental characteristics that differentiate human cognition
from that of other animals in ways that allow for characteristically human
behaviour? Considering continuities and discontinuities, we can already say
something about the answer to that question, which should narrow down
our search-grid: Whatever those mental characteristics are, they have to be
uniquely human amongst the great apes and universal to all humans. In other
words: If we decide a mental characteristic is definitional to being human,
any other ape that has it would be ‘human’, and any human that doesn’t
have it would not be ‘human’. While universality is hardly ever considered,
uniqueness has been investigated, most informatively, by comparing human
and chimpanzee behaviour, leading to manifold proposals of uniquely human
characteristics: Teaching (Gergely & Csriba, in press), shared intentionality
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), cooperative temperament
(Hare & Tomasello, 2005), understanding of unobservable object properties
(Vonk & Povinelli, in press), symbolic thought (Dennet, 1991; Deacon, 1997),
and relational thought (Gentner, 2003), to just name a few. But at the end
of the day, only careful, taxonomically informed comparisons across all great
apes will tell us what is and what isn’t uniquely human. And similarly, only
extensive anthropologically and linguistically informed comparisons across
human cultures will tell us what is and what isn’t universally human.
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Appendix
A.1 Terminology
A.1.1 Place vs Feature
There are two main strategies for coding object-location: Using place (“I will
be waiting for you just north of the exit”) vs. using object-features (“I’ll be
waiting for you in the red car”).
Place The Place strategy assumes a stable relationship between a target
and the surface. So in a scene with several movable objects supported by
a single surface, the location of any object will be defined relative to the
surface. Other objects in the scene are irrelevant.
Feature The Feature strategy assumes a stable relationship between a tar-
get and it’s closely surrounding (potentially movable) objects. So in a scene
with several movable objects supported by a single surface, the location of
any object will be defined relative to one or more other objects which are
identified by means of their perceptual features. The surface is irrelevant.
A.1.2 Spatial Frames of Reference
Linguistic Frames of Reference
Underlying linguistic descriptions of spatial arrays are coordinate systems
or frames of reference (FoR). They serve to specify the directional relation-
ship between objects, in reference to a shared spatial anchor. A system of
three different kinds of reference systems emerged from analyzing natural
and elicited conversation in over 20 languages at the Max Planck Institute
for Psycholinguists (Levinson, 2003):
Relative Spatial Frame of Reference A Relative FoR describes a figure
(F) to ground (G) relative to a presupposed viewpoint (V) outside both F
and G. V must be centered on an observer. Relative FoR descriptions are
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always ternary.
“The ball is to the left of the tree (from my point of view).”
Intrinsic Spatial Frame of Reference An Intrinsic FoR describes a fig-
ure (F) to ground (G) relative to a coordinate system centered in an ‘inherent
feature’ of G. G must be a faceted object. Instrinsic FoR descriptions are
always binary.
“The tree is at the front of the house.”
Absolute Spatial Frame of Reference An Absolute FoR describes a
figure (F) to ground (G) relative to a coordinate system anchored to fixed,
potentially non-visible bearings centered in G. Absolute FoR descriptions are
always binary.
“Theres an ant by your southern leg.”
Cognitive Frames of Reference
Relating this distinction to a non-linguistic cognitive distinction is a difficult
task. Many systems of classification exist in Cognitive Psychology but most
only feature two different FoRs (e.g. Egocentric vs. Allocentric). From a
cognitive perspective the three linguistic FoRs differ most clearly in which
types of origin they dominantly use for their respective coordinate systems.
Relative constructions dominantly use observers as origin, Intrinsic construc-
tions use faceted objects and Absolute constructions use axes inherent in the
larger surroundings. Indeed, these are frequency patterns, not clear-cut dis-
tinctions. It is quite possible to for example use an observer as origin in an
Intrinsic construction(“The tree is at my front.”). But, to the best of my
knowledge, these are the exceptions. For reasons of parsimony, this thesis
uses the linguistic terminology to refer to the cognitive strategies as well:
Relative (Cognitive) Frames of Reference A Relative cognitive FoR
relates objects within a coordinate system originating in the observer, using
the body axes as directional references (often called egocentric).
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Intrinsic (Cognitive) Frames of Reference An Intrinsic cognitive FoR
relates objects within a coordinate system originating in a faceted object,
using its axes as directional references (often called object-centered).
Absolute (Cognitive) Frames of Reference An Absolute cognitive FoR
relates objects within a coordinate system originating in the structure of
the larger surrounding, using its axes as directional references (often called
geocentric).
A.2 Populations
A.2.1 Non-human populations
All non-human great apes observed in the course of this thesis are captive
animals housed in the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center in Leipzig,
Germany. The Center operates within the context of the Leipzig Zoo and em-
ploys fourteen zoo keepers who provide routine animal care including feeding,
cleaning, and enrichment. The breeding program at the zoo is framed within
the global strategy of the European Endangered Species Program (EEP). All
apes live in social groups with con-specifics and have access to large indoor
and outdoor areas. During the studies reported in this thesis all apes were
fed three times a day on a diet of fruit, vegetables, monkey-chow and occa-
sionally meat. In addition, each season apes receive special foodstuffs (e.g.,
chestnuts) that the keepers hide in certain areas of the enclosure to promote
natural foraging activities; other opportunities for special foraging activities
(e.g., at artificial termite mounds) are also made available on a regular basis.
Participation in study sessions was optional for all animals. In cooperation
with the zoo, the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center supports efforts
to conserve great apes, both in the wild and in captivity. Due to habitat de-
struction through logging and hunting for meat or pets, all great ape species
except the chimpanzee are endangered species according to the 2006 IUCN
Red List of Threatened Species.
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Figure A.1: Phylogenetic tree displaying the evolutionary relationships
between the four extant Hominid genera (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan, Homo). The
photographs display individuals of four representative species. All five ex-
tant species of Hominids participated in research reported in this thesis:
Orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), gorilla (Gorilla gorilla), bonobo (Pan pan-
iscus), chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and human (Homo sapiens). Here I
assume a taxonomy based on monophyletic groups. In this framework Hom-
inidae include all the great apes including humans but not the Hylobatidae
or small apes. Further information about non-human great ape species can
amongst others be found in the following sources: (Macdonald, 2001; Call &
Tomasello, 2007).
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Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)
• Taxonomy
Orangutans diverged from the human lineage approximately 12-15 mil-
lion years ago and therefore represent the great ape most distally re-
lated to humans. According to some, the orangutan populations on the
islands of Sumatra and Borneo represent two distinct species. How-
ever, this taxonomic split is disputed in the literature. Although the
two groups are genetically and morphologically different, both Bornean
and Sumatran orangutans readily breed and produce fertile offspring
in captivity. Furthermore, the behavioral repertoire of Bornean and
Sumatran orangutans is basically identical. I will make no distinction
between the two groups in this thesis.
• Morphology
Orangutans have coarse, long hair that varies from orange to brown
in adults. They are characterized by a strong sexual dimorphism.
Males are for example twice as heavy as females. In addition, there
are two different sexually mature male morphs that are distinguished
by both morphological features and behavioral traits. Fully developed
or ‘flanged’ males display a number of secondary sexual characteristics,
such as wide cheek pads, longer hair, and a large laryngeal sac. Un-
flanged males are about the same size as adult females and do not show
these secondary sexual features, but they are sexually fully mature and
able to sire offspring. Infants’ are born with pink faces that darken
with age.
• Behavior and Ecology
Orangutans represent the only Asian species of great ape and live ex-
clusively in restricted areas on the islands of Sumatra and Borneo.
Orangutans inhabit primary rain forests up to an altitude 1500m. The
orangutan population density varies between 2 to 7 individuals per
km
2. They are mainly arboreal and feed on fruit, leaves, bark and
animal prey. The small food patches in Bornean forests, which cannot
feed more than one orangutan, force the animals to limit their social
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interactions: The male is solitary and his territory overlaps the ter-
ritory of several separate females traveling with their offspring. Thus,
the semi-solitary social organization of orangutans can be described as
an individual-based fission-fusion system that is highly variable over
space and time. The adult male’s long call attracts estrous females for
mating. Unflanged males might forcibly rape females. Every night,
orangutans construct a new leaf nest by braking branches of trees to
form a platform. They may also construct leaf shelters to protect them-
selves from rain. The low population densities and large homeranges
of orangutans require extended and undisturbed forest formations.
– Group Size: 1-5
– Average Body Weight: ♀: 40kg; ♂: 80kg
– Average Life Span: 59 years
– Average Neocortex Ratio1: 3.14
– Estimated Wild Population2: 45 000
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)
• Taxonomy
Gorillas diverged from the human lineage approximately 7-10 million
years ago. Within the Hominidae, they are as genetically distant from
chimpanzees as they are from humans. In some current taxonomies,
gorillas are classified as two species; western gorillas Gorilla gorilla and
eastern gorillas Gorilla beringei. However the split into two different
species is debated and related issues unresolved. Genetically the two
groups are not different enough to justify the split and we know too
little especially about western gorilla’s behaviour in the wild to base
the separation into two species on behavioural differences (as is done
1The neocortex ratio is the ratio between neocortical volume and the volume of the rest
of the brain. The average human neocortex ratio for example is 4.02 (Aiello & Dunbar,
1993). In comparison, spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta), have an average neocortex ratio
of 1.94, one of the highest amongst carnivores (Dunbar & Bever, 1998).
2Source: UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)
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with Chimpanzees and Bonobos). In this thesis I will not differentiate
between the two groups.
• Morphology
Gorillas are the largest and the most sexually dimorphic of all extant
primate species. Gorilla pelage color varies from black over brown to
gray. Adult males have an enlarged sagital crest and a silvery color
on the back that extends to the rump and thighs. Each gorilla has a
unique nose pattern allowing for individual identification, not dissimilar
to human fingerprints.
• Ecology and Behavior
Gorillas occur in two widely separated regions of Central Africa: One
in the west and one in the east and they are found in a variety of
forest habitats including primary low land rainforest, secondary forest,
swamp forest, marshy clearings, and even dense alpine forest up to an
altitude of 3000m. Gorillas are mainly terrestrial quadrupedal knuckle
walkers and build new ground nest for sleeping every night. Depending
on the season Western lowland gorillas feed on fruit, seeds, stems, piths
and insects. They usually live in singlemale multifemale groups, but
larger groups might host several silverback males.
– Group Size: 3-21
– Average Body Weight: ♀: 72kg; ♂: 170kg
– Average Life Span: 50 years
– Average Neocortex Ratio: 3.25
– Estimated Wild Population: 98 000
Bonobos (Pan paniscus)
• Taxonomy
Bonobos belong to the great ape clade together with orangutans, hu-
mans, chimpanzees, and gorillas. Bonobos and chimpanzees are hu-
mans’ closest living relatives. Current estimates suggest that humans
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shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos around 5-7
million years ago. Bonobos along with common chimpanzees(Pan trog-
lodytes), belong to the genus Pan. Their last common ancestor lived
around 1.2 to 2.7 million years ago.
• Morphology
Bonobos are less sexually dimorphic than the other great apes. They
are black and may turn gray with age. Bonobos are sometimes called
pygmy- or dwarf chimpanzees, but these labels are misleading since
bonobos are not actually smaller than chimpanzees, but merely have
a more slender build than their close relatives. The face is black from
birth, and the hair seems to be parted on top of the head. Adult males
and females have over-proportionally large primary genitalia.
• Ecology and Behaviour
Bonobos inhabit the lowland rainforest of the Congo basin in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo. They are mixed arboreal and terrestrial
foragers. They mainly knuckle-walk quadrupedally but they also oc-
casionally walk bipedally. Bonobos feed on fruit leaves, herbs truﬄes,
honey and small animal prey. They live in large multimale multife-
male fission-fusion groups. In contrast to the more patrilineal society
of chimpanzees, the society of bonobos centers around the adult fe-
males. Males establish dominance relationships with each other, but
aggression is generally less intense than in chimpanzees, and conflicts
are often settled in non-agonistic ways. Bonobos often engage in sexual
behaviour that has no reproductive value for conception, including male
and female homosexual interactions. Bonobos build new tree nest for
sleeping every night.
– Group Size: 50-200
– Average Body Weight: ♀: 31kg; ♂: 39kg
– Average Life Span: 40 years
– Average Neocortex Ratio: 3.15
– Estimated Wild Population: 15 000
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Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
• Taxonomy
Chimpanzees and Bonobos are humans’ closest living relatives. Cur-
rent estimates suggest that humans shared a common ancestor with
chimpanzees and bonobos around 5 to 7 million years ago. Likewise,
chimpanzees shared a common ancestor with bonobos between 1.2 and
2.7 million years ago.
• Morphology
Chimpanzees are covered by black hair although some individuals turn
grey with age in some areas of their body. Both genders often have a
short white beard. The ears are prominent. Infants have pink to brown
facial skin that darkens with age. Chimpanzees show a modest sexual
dimorphism with males being slightly larger than females.
• Ecology and Behaviour
Chimpanzees inhabit dry woodland savannahs, grasslands and forests
up to an altitude of 3000m all throughout equatorial Africa. They
are mixed arboreal and terrestrial foragers. While on the ground they
mainly knuckle walk quadrupedally but occasionally also walk biped-
ally. Chimpanzees feed on fruit leaves, herbs truﬄes, honey and animal
prey including other primates. They live in large multimale multife-
male fission-fusion groups with a stable dominance structure in which
males are dominant over females. In the wild, chimpanzees, more than
other non-human great apes, modify objects in their environment as
tools for termite fishing, ant dipping, sponging water, hammers and
anvils. Both infanticide and cannibalism have been reported in wild
Chimpanzees. Humans still quite extensively hunt Chimpanzees for
food and pets and while invasive medical research is forbidden on all
great apes in Europe, US American medical research laboratories still
hold more than 1000 Chimpanzees for invasive experimentation.
– Group Size: 10-100
– Average Body Weight: ♀: 31kg; ♂: 39kg
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– Average Life Span: 53 years
– Average Neocortex Ratio: 3.15
– Estimated Wild Population: at least 175 000
A.2.2 Human populations
Europeans
The Netherlands and Germany are post-industrial Western-European na-
tions with a mixed rural and urban lifestyle, inhabiting a densely populated
landscape. In this thesis, European children under the age of 5 (chapters 2
and 4) were recruited in Leipzig, Germany, a city with approximately 500000
inhabitants. European children above 5 years of age (chapters 3 and 4) were
recruited in Millingen aan de Rijn, a Dutch village with approximately 6000
inhabitants. All children were from mixed socio-economic backgrounds. The
European adult population consisted mainly of university undergraduate stu-
dents attending Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
}Akhoe HaiŞom
The }Akhoe HaiŞom are a group of (recent former) hunter-gatherers living in
the savannah of Northern Namibia, roughly between the Omuramba Owambo
river and the Angolan border. Their language, }Akhoe HaiŞom, is part of the
Khoekhoe cluster within the Khoisan language family. In comparison with
the majority of people living in southern Africa, most speakers of }Akhoe
HaiŞom have maintained an unusual cultural profile including healing trance
dances, hunting magic, a lunar calendar and the use of a landscape-term
system for spatial orientation. As with all people considered to be ‘San’ or
‘Bushmen’, the }Akhoe HaiŞom are politically and economically marginal-
ized and their language has a low reputation. Their traditional hunting and
gathering land has been under threat for the last 60 years at least and has
increasingly been claimed by Bantu people or white Africans as farmland.
As a result, the nomadic lifestyle of the }Akhoe HaiŞom is under serious
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threat and many }Akhoe HaiŞom now find a living as farmhands on farms
in their former homeland. The research reported in this thesis was conduc-
ted at a farm settlement commonly called “Farm 6” in Mangetti West, a
government-owned farm set up to host }Akhoe HaiŞom fleeing from the war
of independence that was ravaging their Northern territories. With some
200 }Akhoe HaiŞom, Farm 6 is the largest concentration of }Akhoe HaiŞom
where they are in the majority. There is now a lower primary school at Farm
6 with grades 1 through 5, with about 60 children attending out of a popu-
lation of 90 potential pupils. The languages of instruction are English and
Khoekhoegowab, the only standardised variety of the Khoekhoe cluster.
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Summary
Approximately 70 000 years ago, Homo sapiens sapiens was on the brink
of extinction. The effective population consisted of roughly 4000 individu-
als. A mere 50 000 years later, Homo sapiens sapiens is the only remaining
species of the genus Homo and after another 20 000 years 6 Billion Homo
sapiens sapiens populate every possible corner of the planet across a variety
of habitats unmatched by any other mammal species. Of course we are by
far not the only survivors of that time. Every animal roaming earth today
in one way or the other successfully adapted to its particular evolutionary
pressures. Among those animals are very close relatives of the Homo lineage:
The other great apes. But somehow the evolutionary path and the current
behavioural patterns of Homo sapiens sapiens seem quite different even from
our nearest living cousins. So what was it? What did Homo sapiens sapiens
have that other Homo didn’t? Was it sheer luck? Or were these 4000 indi-
viduals different in a way that ensured their survival? The conviction seems
to be that they were indeed special and that their speciality was not their
strength, or durability, but their cognitive abilities. Sapiens sapiens was the
better thinker.
In the effort to understand our origins and place amongst the other an-
imals we ask questions such as: What were the cognitive structures of our
common ancestors? Are there inherited cognitive defaults in humans? If so,
which ones are evolutionarily old, and which ones are recent innovations?
Does ‘inherited’ mean immune to ontogenetic factors? From a scientists per-
spective, the biggest problem with these questions is that cognition does
not fossilize. Paleoanthropologists have inferred cognitive abilities based on
skull shape and handcrafted artifacts but the available information is only
distantly related to the actual phenomenon of interest: cognition. In this
dissertation I try to create an additional and slightly more direct empirical
access to inherited cognitive structures in humans and assess their vulnerab-
ility to ontogenetic factors such as cognitive maturation and cross-cultural
variation.
The goal of this thesis is in essence to infer cognitive abilities in an evol-
utionary ancestor to Homo sapiens sapiens. Any cognitive ability, which is
part of a shared repertoire between related species, is likely to be part of the
evolutionary inheritance ever since their last common ancestor. Following a
similar approach, humans have been compared to capuchin monkeys, tam-
arins, and chimpanzees to name but a few. And indeed continuities between
humans and our phylogenetic cousins are striking. Not only do other prim-
ates display understanding of faces, distinctiveness of hidden objects and
number, they also display ‘human-like’ abilities in more complex cognitive
tasks such as perspective taking and cooperation. But comparisons between
humans and one other, maybe even distantly related primate, as interesting
as it might be, will not tell us anything about an evolutionary ancestor to
humans. To put it bluntly: Chimpanzees are not a human ancestor. Neither
is any other living primate. Evolution is not a stepwise process in which or-
ganisms moved closer and closer to the human state. Every living animal is
the momentary result of a long evolutionary history. Chimpanzees are as far
removed in evolutionary time from their last common ancestor with humans,
as humans are. With that in mind, we can still use a comparative approach
to gain information about our evolutionary ancestors, as long as we are care-
ful about who we compare with whom. The argument goes as follows: If a
certain trait exists in all species of a close phylogenetic family (clade), the
trait must have been present in their common ancestor. Ideally one would
compare all extant species of a maximally large family with a single common
ancestor. The great apes are such a close family of species with a common
ancestor (Hominidae). Today 5 Hominid species are still in existence: Or-
angutans, Gorillas, Bonobos, Chimpanzees and Humans. If all these species
shared a particular cognitive preference or ability, it is most likely part of the
evolutionary inheritance of the family at least ever since their last common
ancestor, and therefore also an evolutionarily old, inherited cognitive default
in humans.
The investigated cognitive domain in this thesis is spatial cognition, more
specifically spatial memory strategies and concepts of how objects are ‘or-
ganized’ in space (spatial relations). Across three experiments I compared
all 4 species of non-human great apes, and humans of 4 different age-groups
and 2 different cultures on their preferences in these cognitive abilities.
In chapter 2, using a basic spatial memory task, I first contrast the
skills of all the extant great apes including 1-year old human infants. Results
show that all non-human great apes and 1-year old human infants exhibit the
same preference for a particular memory strategy. This suggests the common
ancestor of all great apes had the same preference. Further tests revealed the
reverse preference in 3-year old human children. Thus, the continuity between
our species and the other great apes is masked during early human ontogeny.
Increasing language proficiency and the accompanying rapid enculturation
are discussed as possible explanations for the change in strategy-preference.
Language and culture facilitate flexible adaptations to varying ecologies,
enabling humans to inhabit a vast repertoire of environments. So if language
and culture vary across humans, and if language and culture can restructure
our inherited predispositions in early development (chapter 2), mature cog-
nition might also vary between cultural communities. Chapter 3 addresses
the question if variability across languages might result in cognitive variab-
ility across their speakers. Dutch and Namibian elementary school children
were compared using a spatial reconstruction task. The two cultures differ
in the way they predominantly express spatial relations in language. Three
experiments investigated cognitive strategy preferences across different levels
of task-complexity and instruction. Data show a correlation between dom-
inant linguistic expressions and preference patterns in a non-linguistic cog-
nitive task. When instructed to use their respective non-habitual cognitive
strategy, participants were not easily able to switch between strategies and
their attempts to do so decreased their performance levels. The possibility
that language might play a role in inducing stable preferences in cognitive
strategy is discussed.
On the one hand, all humans inherit cognitive predispositions from an
evolutionary ancestor (chapter 2). On the other hand, human cognition is
variably adaptable to cultural circumstance (chapter 3). Although these two
statements could be seen to contradict each other, I argue in chapter 4 that
they need not be. First, the same two cultural groups as in chapter 3 are
compared on their cognition for spatial relations. As before the two cultural
groups diverge, parallel to linguistic coding strategies. Furthermore, mature
non-human great apes were tested with the very same spatial task to estab-
lish the inherited primate baseline. Results show that human culture can
override even the basic cognitive preferences we inherited from our common
ancestor with the other great apes. In conclusion I propose a model for hu-
man cognition that has a rich, inherited primate basis, which may be masked
by language and culture, predicting differential human performance in the
conditions where culture overrides an inherited default strategy.
We will only be in a position to appreciate the distinctive hallmarks of
human cognition when we understand both the continuities and discontinuit-
ies within Homo sapiens and across all the extant members of our immediate
phylogenetic family, the Hominidae.
Samenvatting
Ongeveer 70 000 jaar geleden stond Homo sapiens sapiens op het punt van
uitsterven. De effectieve populatie bestond uit ruwweg 4000 individuen. Niet
meer dan 50 000 jaar later is Homo sapiens sapiens de enig overgebleven
soort van het geslacht Homo en nog 20 000 jaar later bewonen 6 miljard
Homo sapiens sapiens alle mogelijke uithoeken van onze planeet, verspreid
over een verscheidenheid aan habitats, hierin ongevenaard door welke andere
soort zoogdier dan ook. Natuurlijk zijn we bij lange na niet de enige over-
levenden uit die tijd. Elk dier dat vandaag de dag over de aarde zwerft heeft
zich op de een of andere wijze met succes aangepast aan zijn specifieke evolu-
tionaire problemen. Onder die dieren bevinden zich nauwe verwanten van het
geslacht Homo: de andere grote apen. Maar op de een of andere manier lijken
de evolutionaire ontwikkeling en de huidige gedragspatronen van de Homo
sapiens sapiens behoorlijk verschillend van zelfs onze meest verwante neven
en nichten. Dus wat was het? Wat had Homo sapiens sapiens dat de andere
Homo niet hadden? Was het puur toeval? Of waren deze 4000 personen
op een zodanige wijze verschillend van de anderen, dat dit hun overleving
garandeerde? Men lijkt ervan overtuigd te zijn, dat ze inderdaad bijzonder
waren en dat hun bijzonderheid niet in hun kracht of fysieke uithoudings-
vermogen lag, maar in hun cognitieve vermogens. Sapiens sapiens was de
betere denker.
Als we onze herkomst en plaats tussen de andere dieren willen begrijpen,
stellen we vragen als: wat waren de cognitieve structuren van onze gemeenschap-
pelijke voorouders? Heeft de mens gerfde cognitieve standaardeigenschap-
pen? En zo ja, welke hiervan zijn in evolutionair opzicht oud, en welke
zijn recente vernieuwingen? Betekent ’gerfd’ immuun voor ontogenetische
factoren? Vanuit het perspectief van een wetenschapper is het grootste prob-
leem bij deze kwesties dat cognitie niet in fossielen terug te vinden is. Pa-
leoantropologen hebben cognitieve vermogens herleid uit schedelvormen en
handgemaakte artefacten, maar de beschikbare informatie is slechts indirect
gerelateerd aan het verschijnsel waarin we genteresseerd zijn: cognitie. In
deze dissertatie probeer ik een directere empirische toegang te krijgen tot
gerfde cognitieve structuren van de mens en de kwetsbaarheid ervan te be-
palen voor ontogenetische factoren, zoals cognitieve rijpheid en interculturele
variatie.
Een belangrijk doel van dit proefschrift is om uit de cognitieve vermogens
van Homo sapiens sapiens en zijn evolutionair naaste verwanten de cognitieve
vermogens van een gedeelde evolutionaire voorouder af te leiden. Elk cog-
nitief vermogen dat wordt gedeeld door verwante soorten maakt waarschijn-
lijk deel uit van de evolutionaire overerving sinds hun laatste gemeenschap-
pelijke voorouder. Met een dergelijke benadering zijn mensen vergeleken
met kapucijnapen, tamarins en chimpansees, om er slechts een aantal te noe-
men. En inderdaad is de samenhang tussen mensen en onze fylogenetische
neven en nichten opvallend. Andere primaten hebben niet alleen herkenning
van gezichtsuitdrukking, objectpermanentie, en het onderscheiden van get-
allen, ze vertonen ook ’menselijke’ vermogens bij meer complexe cognitieve
taken, zoals het innemen van een perspectief en van samenwerking. Maar
vergelijkingen tussen mensen en een andere, misschien zelfs ver verwante
primaat, hoe interessant ze ook zijn, zeggen nog niets over een evolutionaire
voorouder van de mens. Om het simpel te zeggen: de chimpansee is geen
voorouder van de mens. Net zo min als welke andere levende primaat dan
ook. Evolutie is geen stapsgewijs proces waarbij organismen steeds meer de
menselijke levensvorm zijn gaan benaderen. Elk levend dier is het tijdelijke
resultaat van een lange evolutionaire geschiedenis. Chimpansees zijn in evol-
utionaire tijd net zo ver verwijderd van hun laatste gemeenschappelijke voor-
ouder met de mens als de mens dat zelf is. Met deze wetenschap in ons achter-
hoofd kunnen we nog steeds een vergelijkende benadering gebruiken om in-
formatie te krijgen over onze evolutionaire voorouders, zolang we ons bewust
blijven van wie we met wie vergelijken. De redenering luidt als volgt: als
een bepaald kenmerk bij alle soorten van een nauw verwante fylogenetische
familie (clade) voorkomt, moet dat kenmerk aanwezig geweest zijn bij hun
gemeenschappelijke voorouder. Idealiter zou men alle nog bestaande soorten
van een zo groot mogelijke familie vergelijken met een enkele gemeenschap-
pelijke voorouder. De grote apen zijn zo’n nauw verwante familie van soorten
met een gemeenschappelijke voorouder (Hominidae). Vandaag de dag zijn
er nog vijf soorten Hominiden in leven: Orang-oetangs, Gorillas, Bonobos,
Chimpansees en de Mens. Als al deze soorten een bepaalde cognitieve voorkeur
of een cognitief vermogen zouden delen, dan behoort deze zeer waarschijnlijk
tot de evolutionaire overerving van de familie (tenminste sinds hun laatste
gemeenschappelijke voorouder) en dan zou het daardoor ook een evolutionair
oude, gerfde cognitieve standaardeigenschap van de mens zijn.
Het cognitieve domein dat in dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht is ruimtelijke
cognitie, en meer specifiek, ruimtelijke geheugenstrategien en concepten van
ruimtelijke relaties. In drie experimenten heb ik alle vier de soorten niet-
menselijke grote apen, en mensen uit vier verschillende leeftijdsgroepen en
uit twee verschillende culturen vergeleken ten aanzien van hun voorkeuren
binnen deze cognitieve vermogens.
In hoofdstuk 2 vergelijk ik eerst door middel van een elementaire ruimtelijke
geheugentaak de vaardigheden van alle tegenwoordig nog levende grote apen
en 1 jaar oude mensenkinderen. De resultaten laten zien dat alle niet-
menselijke grote apen en 1 jaar oude mensenkinderen dezelfde voorkeuren
vertonen voor een bepaalde geheugenstrategie. Dit doet vermoeden dat de
gemeenschappelijke voorouder van alle grote apen dezelfde voorkeur had. Uit
andere tests kwam naar voren, dat 3 jaar oude mensenkinderen juist een te-
genovergestelde voorkeur hadden. Zo wordt de continuteit tussen onze soort
en de andere grote apen verhuld tijdens de vroege menselijke ontogenese.
Toenemende taalbeheersing en de daarmee gepaard gaande snelle cultural-
isatie worden besproken als mogelijke verklaringen voor de verandering van
voorkeursstrategie.
Taal en cultuur vergemakkelijken een flexibele aanpassing aan verschil-
lende ecosystemen, waardoor het mogelijk wordt voor de mens om een uit-
gebreid scala aan milieus te bewonen. Dus als taal en cultuur tussen mensen
verschillen, en als taal en cultuur onze gerfde aanleg in de vroege ontwikkel-
ing kan herstructureren (hoofdstuk 2), dan zou de volgroeide cognitie tussen
culturele gemeenschappen ook kunnen variren. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de
vraag of verschillen tussen talen cognitieve verschillen tussen haar sprekers
tot gevolg kan hebben. Nederlandse en Namibische kleuterschoolkinderen
zijn vergeleken in het toepassen van een ruimtelijke reconstructietaak. De
twee culturen verschillen op de manier waarin ze ruimtelijke relaties in taal
uitdrukken. Drie experimenten onderzochten de cognitieve voorkeursstrategie
bij verschillende culturen, niveaus van taakcomplexiteit, en instructie. De
data laten een correlatie zien tussen de in een cultuur gebruikelijke taalkun-
dige uitdrukkingen en voorkeurspatronen in een niet-talige cognitieve taak.
Wanneer de deelnemers genstrueerd werden om hun niet-gebruikelijke cog-
nitieve strategie te gebruiken, kostte het hen moeite om te veranderen van
strategie, en hun pogingen om dat te doen deed hun prestatieniveau afne-
men. De mogelijkheid wordt besproken dat taal een rol zou spelen in het
veroorzaken van stabiele voorkeuren voor een bepaalde cognitieve strategie.
Enerzijds erven alle mensen hun cognitieve aanleg van een evolutionaire
voorouder (hoofdstuk 2). Anderzijds is menselijke cognitie aanpasbaar aan
culturele omstandigheden (hoofdstuk 3). Hoewel deze twee stellingen te-
genstrijdig lijken, bepleit ik in Hoofdstuk 4 dat dit niet zo hoeft te zijn.
Eerst worden dezelfde twee culturele groepen als in hoofdstuk 3 vergeleken
wat betreft hun cognitie voor ruimtelijke relaties. Opnieuw lopen de twee
culturele groepen uiteen, parallel met hun taalkundige coderingsstrategien.
Verder werden volwassen niet-menselijke grote apen met dezelfde ruimtelijke
taak getest om de gerfde primate baseline vast te stellen. Uit de resultaten
blijkt dat de menselijke cultuur zelfs de cognitieve basisvoorkeuren die we met
de andere grote apen van onze gemeenschappelijke voorouder gerfd hebben,
teniet kan doen. Tot besluit stel ik een model van de menselijke cognitie voor
met een rijke, van de primaten gerfde basis, die door taal en cultuur verhuld
kan worden, en die andere menselijke prestaties voorspelt in omstandigheden
waar de cultuur een gerfde standaardstrategie onderdrukt en door een andere
vervangt.
We zullen alleen in staat zijn de onderscheidende kenmerken van de
menselijke cognitie te waarderen als we zowel de continuteiten als de dis-
continuteiten binnen Homo sapiens sapiens en tussen alle bestaande leden
van onze directe fylogenetische familie, de Homonidae, begrijpen.
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